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INSIGHT LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, DONALD F. 
HUTTON, AN UNMARRIED MAN, HLT REAL ESTATE LLC AN IDAHO 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, THE EARLE-HENRION TRUST, DATED 
JANUARY 27,1998, SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY OF DANIEL C. EARLE 
and INDEPENDENT MORTAGAGE LTD. CO., AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., AN IDAHO CORPORATION, RON HAZEL, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
SARAH HAZEL, SPOUSE OF RON HAZEL, DAREN BROTT, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
SUSAN BROTT, SPOUSE OF DAREN BROTT, and PATRICK GUNTER AND 
MONICA GUNTER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
Defendants / Respondents. 
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Bonner County 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
District Judge 
CHARLES R. DEAN, JR 
Attorney for Appellant 
MARC LYONS 
Attorney for Respondents 
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10/30/2008 DFLT 
First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2008-0001538 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
Insight LLC, etal. vs. Summitt Inc, an Idaho Corporation, etal. 
User 
PHILLIPS New Case Filed - Other Claims 
PHILLIPS Plaintiff: Insight LLC Appearance Catherine L. 
Dullea 
User: PUBLIC 
Judge 
Steve Yerby 
Steve Yerby 
PHILLIPS Filing: A - Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 Steve Yerby 
Paid by: Catherine Dullea Receipt number: 
0399771 Dated: 8/27/2008 Amount: $88.00 
(Check) For: Insight LLC (plaintiff) 
PHILLIPS Plaintiff: Hutton, Donald F. Appearance Catherine Steve Yerby 
L. Dullea 
PHILLIPS Plaintiff: HLT Real Estate LLC Appearance Steve Yerby 
Catherine L. Dullea . 
PHILLIPS Plaintiff: Independent Mortgage Ltd Co Steve Yerby 
Appearance Catherine L. Dullea 
PHILLIPS Plaintiff: The Earle-Henrion Trust, dated January Steve Yerby 
27, 1998 Appearance Catherine L. Dullea 
PHILLIPS Complaint Filed - Complaint for Foreclosure of Steve Yerby 
Mortgage and Deed of Trust 
PHILLIPS Summons Issued Steve Yerby 
PHILLIPS Lis Pendens filed - Recording #757563 Steve Yerby 
PHILLIPS Filing: 17 - All Other Cases Paid by: Kenneth Steve Yerby 
Jacobsen Receipt number: 0402927 Dated: 
10/17/2008 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Gunter, 
Patrick (defendant) 
PHILLIPS Defendant: Gunter, Patrick Appearance Kenneth Steve Yerby 
T.Jacobsen 
PHILLIPS Defendant: Gunter, Monica Appearance Kenneth Steve Yerby 
T. Jacobsen 
PHILLIPS Notice Of Appearance - Jacobsen Idaho Supreme Court 
PHILLIPS Affidavit Re: Default of Defendants Summitt, Steve Yerby 
Hazel and Brott 
PHILLIPS Summons Returned Steve Yerby 
PHILLIPS Affidavit Of Service - Ron Hazel served for Steve Yerby 
Summit Inc 9/06/08 
PHILLIPS Affidavit Of Service - Ron Hazel served 9/06/08 Steve Yerby 
PHILLIPS Affidavit Of Service - Ron Hazel subserved for Steve Yerby 
Sarah Hazel 9/06/08 
PHILLIPS Affidavit Of Service - Darren Brott served for Steve Yerby 
Darren and Susan Brott 9/07/08 
PHILLIPS Affidavit Of Service - Monica Gunter served for Steve Yerby 
Pat and Monica Gunter 9/24/08 
PHILLIPS Default of Defendants Summitt, Hazel and Brott Steve Yerby 
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DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, ISB #4072 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT, ISB #7036 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
• 1 '. \ 1_ ... 
Attorneys for Defendants Patrick and Monica Gunter 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an 
unmarried man; HL T REAL ESTATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January 
27, 1998, sole and separate property of 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of 
Daren Brott; and PATRICK GUNTER and 
MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-1538 
DEFENDANTS GUNTERS' 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Defendants, PATRICK GUNTER AND MONICA GUNTER, by and 
through their attorneys of record, and submit this Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
-doo-
DEFENDANTS GUNTERS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - I 
The Court, on summary judgment, correctly noted that Idaho is a race-notice state. 
Order on PIs' Mot. for Summ. J., at 3. The Court went on to correctly state that in a race-notice 
jurisdiction, "[w]here one purchases or encumbers with notice of inconsistent claims, one does 
not do so in good faith and similarly, where on fails to investigate open or obviously 
inconsistent claims, one cannot take in good faith." Id. Next, the Court analyzed Estate of 
Skvorak v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 89 P.3d 856 (2004) and determined that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the plaintiffs or the Gunters were the initial 
encumbrancers; therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied. Order on 
PIs' Mot. for Summ. J, at 8. (Emphasis added). However, the Estate of Skvorak is inapposite 
to the facts of this case. In Estate of Skvorak, the dispute was over the priority of two purchase 
money encumbrancers that had notice of each other prior to entering into any security 
agreement with the purchaser. The rule of law expressed by the Court in the Estate of Skvorak 
must only be applied in Skvorak's the limited circumstance where priority needs to be 
determined between two purchase money lenders with notice of one another; otherwise, the 
purpose behind the recording statutes is defeated. 
The Estate of Skvorak Court ruled that where there are two purchase money mortgagors 
and neither of them were good faith encumbrancers, priority is determined by establishing who 
was the first to encumber. This is logical. The purpose of the recording acts is to protect good 
faith purchaser giving value. See, Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758,761,572 P.2d 861,864 
(1977)(the primary purpose of the recording statutes is to give protection to bona fide third 
parties who may be dealing in the same property). See also, Raynor v. Alexander, 2005 WL 
1663264, 4 (Idaho Dist.) (2005)(Unreported) Skvorak's reasoning only makes sense where 
there is .!!Q good faith purchaser. In other words, where both encumbrancers have notice, which 
-do/-
DEFENDANTS GUNTERS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
ever one records first has priority (hence: race/notice, as opposed to race -or- notice). 
Unlike Skvorak, this case involves a dispute over the priority of two purchase money 
encumbrancers where only one encumbrancer had notice of the other. The Gunters agree with 
the plaintiffs' statement regarding Idaho's recording statute. 
"'Race-Notice' means that the first to record takes priority unless 
the first to record has actual or constructive notice of a prior 
existing claim. If he does, the first to record is not a good faith 
encumbrancer and thus not entitled to priority regardless of the 
order of recordation. For example, a lender making a non-
purchase money loan who has knowledge of an unrecorded 
mortgage securing an earlier loan would not take priority over that 
mortgage regardless of recording priority because he had 'notice'. 
The 'race' to the Recorder's Office is not determinative in that 
situation by express statutory mandate." (Emphasis added) 
Pls'Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Recons., at 3. 
The Gunters expand the plaintiffs' statement by noting that all lenders (not just 
lenders making non-purchase money loans) who have knowledge of an unrecorded mortgage 
securing an earlier loan would not take priority regardless of the timing of their recording. 
Idaho Code § 45-112 provides that even a mortgage given for the price of real property, 
otherwise know as a "purchase-money mortgage" is subject to the operation of the 
recording laws. See, 1 C. § 45-112. (Emphasis added). The good faith of the Gunters is 
relevant in adding the "notice" requirement back into the race-notice rule oflaw. 
Finally, if the court were to expand Skvorak's rule to apply in situations such as this, 
it could invite parties to perpetrate fraud because the risk of incurring any adverse 
consequence for perpetrating the fraud would be eliminated. A party acting in bad faith 
could defeat the good faith purchaser simply by recording one minute before the good faith 
purchaser. There is a mechanism whereby a party with knowledge of a competing interest in 
-~o d.. -
DEFENDANTS GUNTERS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
the property can get priority over the good faith purchaser, that mechanism is a subordination 
agreement. The facts of this case are that Independent Mortgage was aware of the 
requirement to get a subordination agreement prior to recording. Independent Mortgage 
simply decided not to put the Gunters on notice of its mortgage. 
Again, the undisputed facts, as determined by the Court are that Independent 
Mortgage knew of the Gunter's interest before Independent Mortgage loaned and directed 
the escrow agent to record Independent Mortgage's interest first. Order on Pis' Mot. for 
Summ. J, at 4. Independent Mortgage must not be allowed to be treated as a good faith 
purchaser or to be put on equal footing with the Gunters who did act in good faith without 
knowledge of Independent Mortgage's existence. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2009. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ril M. Linscott, ofthe Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Gunter 
-do 3 -
DEFENDANTS GUNTERS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Catherine L. Dullea, Chtd. 
Attorney at Law 
101 N. Fourth Ave., Ste. 204 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
DEAN & KOLTS 
2020 Lakewood Dr., Ste. 212 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814 
u.s. MAIL --
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL ""7 FACSIMILE (208) 265-1556 
U.s. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED --
OVERNIGHT MAIL + FACSIMILE (208) 664-9844 
-dol/-
DEFENDANTS GUNTERS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 5 
Catherine L. Dullea, ISB # 5309 
Catherine L. Dullea, Chtd. 
101 N. 4th St., Suite 204 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 265-2276 / Fax (208) 265-1556 
Charles R. Dean, Jr., ISB #5763 
DEAN & KOLTS 
Attorneys at Law 
1110 West Park Place Suite 212 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
(208) 664-7794 / Fax (208) 664-9844 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability, 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an, 
unmarried man; HLT REAL EST ATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE, 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January, 
27, 1998, sole and separate property of, 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT, 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited, 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON, 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an, 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of, 
DAREN BROTT; and PATRICK GUNTER 
and, MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) Case No.: CV 08-1538 
) 
) 
) REPL Y MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
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REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION- 1 
ARGUMENT 
Once again, the Gunters seriously misinterpret Estate of Skvorak v. Security Union Title 
Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16 (2004). Skivorak is not to be applied in "limited circumstances" where 
both lenders have "notice of each other prior to entering into any security agreement with the 
purchaser". Instead, Skvorak clearly and unequivocally holds that when considering the priority 
of mortgages given to secure two purchase money loans, the first to record takes priority 
regardless of any actual knowledge one may have ofthe other. 
A focused analysis of Skvorak reveals the errors in the Gunters' arguments. First, the fact 
the two mortgages in Skvorak were deemed to be "purchase money" is significant for only one 
reason. Idaho Code § 45-112 states that a purchase money mortgage takes priority over other 
liens given by the purchaser subject to the recording statutes. The plaintiff in Skvorak apparently 
argued for priority under § 45-112, claiming that Crown Pacific's mortgage either did not secure 
part of the purchase price of was given in a separate transaction. Both the trial court and the 
Idaho Supreme Court found otherwise since both lenders had financed part of the purchase price 
in a single transaction. The Estate of Skvorak was thus not entitled to priority on that basis. 
Since there is no issue in this case that both the loans by IMLC and the Gunters are purchase 
money, that part of the analysis in the Skvorak decision and the Gunters' focus thereon is ' 
irrelevant. 
Second, the fact that the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that both parties 
had actual knowledge of the other before the recordings is also irrelevant to the ultimate outcome 
of that case. The plaintiff in Skvorak argued on appeal that its decedent did not have notice of 
Crown Pacific's mortgage (Id at 22). After finding that Crown Pacific's admitted knowledge of 
the vendor's loan was irrelevant since the rules upon which the Gunters rely in this case do not 
-;2oLP-
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION- 2 
apply to purchase money lenders who are first to record, the Supreme Court simply dismissed 
Skvorak's argument by holding that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court for it to 
conclude otherwise. 
The fact that the plaintiff in Skvorak had actual knowledge of the Crown Pacific loan and 
mortgage, however, was not determinative of the case in any way. Aside from the utter lack of 
logic that the rules recited by the Supreme Court in Skvorak only apply when the vendor knows 
about the third party lender, the decision specifically holds otherwise. After unequivocally 
stating without qualifying or limiting language that under "Idaho's recording statutes, a mortgage 
recorded first in time as priority against all subsequent mortgages", the Supreme Court stated: 
Because the Skvoraks did not record first and had at least constructive notice of the Crown 
Pacific mortgage, Crown Pacific's mortgage takes priority" (Id at 23). The fact that the trial 
court found they also had actual notice did not matter. 
Nothing is different in this case. Both mortgages are purchase money, IMLC recorded 
first and, as of the instant of such recording, the Gunters had at least constructive notice of 
IMLC's mortgage when their mortgage was recorded. 
Dated: August 21, 2009 
-;<a1--
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION- 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
April M. Linscott 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
[gI U.S. MAIL 
o FEDEX GROUND 
o HAND DELIVERED 
o OVERNIGHT MAIL 
o FACSIMILE 
- dOf'--
Sep.30. 2009 8:24AM FRlrnLANDER HAYNES MITCHELL STOW No.0460 P. I/IU 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability 
Company, DONALD F. HUnON, an 
unmarried man, et. aI., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho Corporation. RON) 
HAZEL, an individual, et.al., 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to IRep 161T IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Case No. S CV 2008 1538 
SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE 
OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
1. A JURY trial for 3 day(s) will commence at the BONNER County Courthouse at 
9:00 a.m. on MARCH 15,2010. If possible, cases set for the same day will be tried 
on a to follow basis. 
2. The Court, at its discretion, will set the priority for each of the civil matters set 
for trial on the above date. Any party may request a priority setting by filing a request 
for Priority Setting, copy to the Court in chambers. The Court will attempt to give 
priority to cases where such Request for Priority Setting is filed in the order in which 
they are filed. Prior participation in mediation is a factor in granting priority. Notice is 
hereby given that all civil trial settings are subject to being preempted by the 
court's criminal calendar. 
SeD.30. 2009 8:24AM FR,r~LANDER HAYNES MITCHELL STOW No.0460 p. 2110 
In order to assist with the pretrial conference and trial of this matter IT IS HEREBY 
FURTHER ORDERED that: 
1.. a. PRETRIAL EVENTS: Before noticing a deposition, hearing or other pretrial 
event, a lawyer should consult and work with opposing counsel to accommodate the 
needs and reasonable requests of all witnesses and participating lawyers. 
b. MOTION PRACTICE: Before setting a motion for a hearing, a lawyer should 
make a reasonable effort to resolve the issue without involving the Court. A lawyer who 
has no valid objection to an opponenfs proposed motion should promptly make this 
position known to opposing counsel. After a hearing. a lawyer charged with preparing the 
proposed order should draft it promptly, striving to fairly and accurately articulate the 
Court's ruling. Before submitting the proposed order to the Court, the lawyer should 
provide a copy to opposing counsel who should promptly voice any objections. If the 
lawyers cannot resolve all objections, the drafting lawyer should promptly submit the 
proposed order to the Court, stating any unresolved objections. 
c. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed 
so as to be heard not later than ninety (90) days before trial. The last day for filing all 
other pretrial motions shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial, except for motions in 
limine concerning witnesses and exhibits designated pursuant to paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 
respectively of this Pretrial Order. Motions in limine concerning designated witnesses and 
exhibits shall be submitted in writing at least seven (7) days before trial. Motions in 
limine concerning any deSignated exhibit shall attach copies of the exhibit in issue. 
Motions in limine regarding designated witnesses shall attach copies of the discovery 
requests claimed to require the earlier disclosure and a representation by counsel 
regarding the absence of a prior response from the party to whom the discovery was 
-c2/o-
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directed. The fact that a party which has submitted discovery to another party has not 
filed motions to compel in advance of trial does not, in and of itself, waive an objection by 
that party as to the timeliness of disclosure of witnesses and exhibits by the other party as 
required by this order. 
2. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: There shall be served and filed with 
each motion for summary judgment a separate concise statement, together with a 
reference to the record, of each of the material facts as to which the moving party 
contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any party opposing the motion shall, 
not later than fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing, serve and file a 
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all 
material facts as to which it is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be 
litigated. In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that 
the facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except 
and to the extent that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by 
a statement filed in opposition to the motion. 
3. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: In addition to any original brief or memorandum 
filed with the Clerk of the Court. a chambers' copy shall be provided to the Court. To the 
extent counsel rely on legal authorities not contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of 
each case or authority cited shall be attached to the Court's copy of the brief or 
memorandum. 
4. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertain 
any discovery motion. except those brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c) by a person who is 
not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the Court. at the time of filing 
the motion, a certification that the lawyer making the motion has in good faith conferred or 
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,SeD.30.2009 8:24AM FR 1C 8LANDER HAYNES MITCHELL STOW No.0460 p. 4/10 
attempted to confer with the opposing lawyer to reach agreement without court action. 
pursuant to I.RC.P. 37(a)(2). The motion shall not refer the Court to other documents in 
the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is in issue, the 
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient 
answer. followed by each party's contentions, separately stated. In the absence of a 
showing of good cause as to why the discovery was not initiated so that timely responses 
were due at least thirty (30) days before trial. the Court will not hear motions to compel 
discovery after twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
5. EXPERT WITNESSES: Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before 
trial, plaintiff{s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred 
fifty (150) days before trial, defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. 
Such disclosure shall consist of at least the subject matter upon which the expert is 
expected to testify and the substance of any opinions to which the expert is expected to 
testify. The disclosure shall be contemporaneously filed with the Court. 
Each party shall, at least twenty .. ight (28) days before trial. file with the Court 
and serve all parties with a supplemental disclosure for each expert witness which shall 
identify the underlying facts and data upon which the opinions of each expert are based, 
to the extent such information is required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(A)(i). Absent good cause, an expert may not testify to matters not included in 
the disclosure. A party may comply with the disclosure by referencing expert witness 
depositions. without restating the deposition testimony in the disclosure report. 
6. DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES: Each party shall prepare and exchange 
between the parties and file with the Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial a list 
of witnesses with current addresses and tel~hone numbers, setting forth a brief 
-OI/~·-
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statement identifying the general subject matter about which the witness may be asked to 
testify (exclusive of impeachment witnesses). Each party shall provide opposing parties 
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copies of each list 
of witnesses. 
7. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: Using the attached form, each party shall 
prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offer, Exhibits should be listed in the order that the 
party anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before 
trial. After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be 
made. Plaintiffs exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits 
shall be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the 
date of the trial shall also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. Exhibit lists and copies 
of exhibits shall be exchanged between parties and the exhibit list flied with the Clerk at 
least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original exhibits and a Judge's copy of the 
exhibits should be flied with the Clerk at the time of trial. Two copies of the exhibit list are 
to be filed with the Clerk. It is expected that each party will have a copy of all exhibits to 
be used at trial. 
8. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions shall be prepared and eXChanged 
between the parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies delivered to chambers) at least 
seven (7) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock instructions covering the 
following Idaho Jury Instructions: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.04, 1.05, 1.09, 1.11, 1.13, 
1.13.1, 1.15.2, 1.20.1, 1.22, 1.24.1 and 9.00. Copies of the Court's stock instructions 
may be obtained from the Court, and are available on the Kootenai County website 
(www.co.kootenaUd.us/dpeartmentldistrictcourtiforms.asp). The parties shall meet in 
good faith to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the 
-:J /3--
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Court with the other proposed instructions. Absent agreement. each party shall submit 
their own statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 51(a). A party objecting to any requested jury instruction shall 
tile at the time of trial written objections to jury instructions. 
9. TRIAL BRIEFS: Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the 
parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies to chambers) at least seven (7) days before 
trial. 
10. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court, each 
party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial file with the opposing parties and the 
Court (with copies to chambers) proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
supporting their position. 
11. TRIAL PRACTICE: At least a week before trial the lawyers shall meet and 
confer to discuss any stipulations that can be made at the beginning of trial and what 
exhibits can be admitted by stipulation. Following this meeting, the parties shall 
immediately alert the Court to any matters that need to be taken up before the time 
scheduled for trial to begin. 
12. TRIAL DAY: After the first day of trial, all subsequent trial days will likely be on 
an 8:30 a.m. to 1 :30 p.m. schedule. 
13. MODIFICATION: This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the 
parties upon entry of an order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may. 
upon motion and for good cause shown. seek leave of the Court modifying the terms of 
this order, upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may 
request a pretrial conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 or mediation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
16(k). 
-J 1£/--
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14. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETIING: Any party moving or stipulating to 
vacate a trial setting shall set forth the reasons for the request and include a 
representation by counsel that these reasons have been discussed with the client and 
that the client has no objection to vacating the trial date. For a continuance to be granted. 
the parties shall have already engaged in mediation, or should expect to engage in 
mediation at the time originally set for the trial or shortly thereafter. 
Any vacation or continuance of the trial day shall not change or alter the time frames 
for the deadlines set forth herein, but the dates for such deadlines will change to the new 
dates as are established by the date of the new trial setting. Any party may. upon motion 
and for good cause shown. request different discovery and disclosure dates upon 
vacation or continuance of the trial date. 
15. MEDIATION: Lawyers should educate their clients early in the legal process 
about the various methods of resolving disputes without trial, including mediation. 
arbitration and neutral case evaluation. The parties are encouraged and expected to 
mediate as soon as possible. The Court will facilitate mediation if requested. The parties 
are ordered to report jointly to the Court in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to trial, 
setting forth when mediation occurred and the results of mediation. If no mediation has 
taken place, the joint report must state the reason the parties are not using mediation. 
16. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE: Failure to timely comply in all 
respects with the provisions of this order shall subject noncomplying parties to sanctions 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16(;). which may include: 
(A) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses. or prohibiting such party from introducing designated 
matters in evidence; 
-d.J~-
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(8) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(C) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto. an order treating 
as contempt of court the failure to comply; 
(D) In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction. the judge shall require the 
party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule. induding attorney's fees. unless 
the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may rely upon any deadline set forth in 
this pretrial order as a reason for failing to timely respond to discovery or to timely 
supplement discovery responses pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c). 
Notice is hereby given. pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d}(1 )(G). that 
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside in this caSe. The following is a list of 
potential alternate judges: Hon. James R. Michaud, Hon. John P. Luster, Hon. Fred 
Gibler. Hon. Charles W. Hosack, Hon. Steve Verby or Hon. George R. Reinhardt. III or 
Han. Lansing L. Haynes. 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause 
under Rule 40(d){1). each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for 
disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after 
service of this notice. 
-J/&-
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party who brings in an additional party shall 
serve a copy of this "Scheduling Order. Notice of Trial Setting" upon that added party at 
the time the pleading adding the party is served on the added party, and proof of such 
service shall then be given to the Court by the party adding an additional party. 
DATED this .3 0 day of September, 2009. 
BY ORDER OFJOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
'1. I hereby certify that true coples of the foregoing have been mailed. postage prepaid or sent by interoffice mail, 
this _.:,)_0_ day of September, 2009, to: If applicable. BONNERCounty Jury Commissioner. Judge Gibler, Judge 
Hosack, Trial Court Administrator .. 
Catherine Dullea 
101 N. Fourth Ave., Ste 204 
SandPQint,lD 8386,k 
~()f -J,{P5 - J~'" 
Bonne,· (0 D;$l-u{ 
Charles Dean 
2020 Lakewood Dr, Suite 212 
Coeur d'Alene. 1083814 
(PIP tf~ tJ( +I 
-JI7-
Douglas Marlice/April LInscott 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'A1ene,IO 83816-1336 
foeA-6f8'1 
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STA i ~ OF IDAHO } 
County of BONNER )55 
FILED __ IO---,,' )o,,--=-"--,-rI1--<--
AT i.~ I) Q O'CIOCk~M 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability ) 
Company, DONALD F. HUTTON. an ) 
unmarried man, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs .. 
SUMMIT, INC •• an Idaho Corporation, 
RON HAZEL, an individual, et.al •• 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. S CV 2008 1538 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION OF 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
On July 24, 2009, this Court entered its Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment On August 3,2009, plaintiffs filed a Motion and Notice of Motion for 
Reconsideration, and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.. On 
August 21, 2009, Defendants Gunters filed Defendants Gunters' Memorandum in 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. Later that same day, plaintiffs filed 
their Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.. On September 29. 
2009, oral argument was held on plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, this Court took the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 
under advisement 
The following are the procedural history and factual background from this Court's 
July 24, 2009, Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Because the other defendants have been defaulted, plaintiffs on 
April 7, 2008, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against 
defendants Patrick and Monica Gunwr only. Plaintiffs are lenders and are 
-d/~-
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owners and holders of a promissory note secured by a mortgage and by a 
deed of trust. Complaint, p. 2, 111, 
The Gunters sold the property at issue to Summit, Inc., (Summit). 
Gunters are owners and holders of a deed of trust securing some of the 
property at issue in the instant action. Complaint, p. 3, 11 7. The Gunters 
financed a portion of Summit's purchase and accepted a promissory note 
for $200,000 from Summit secured by the deed of trust. 
In June 2006, Summit executed a note for $616,000 in favor of 
Independent Mortgage Ltd. Co. (IMLC); the note was secured by a 
mortgage recorded in first priority on June 19, 2006. Complaint, pp. 3-5. 
1J1J 8-13. On October 10, 2008, plaintiffs initiated the foreclosure action at 
issue by filing this Complaint. after Summit and guarantors Ron Hazel and 
Daren Brott defaulted. On April 7, 2008, plaintiffs filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment against defendants Patrick and Monica Gunter. 
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the issue of lien priority because 
Gunters.claim they have the more senior secured interest because, 
although their interest was recorded after plaintiffs', plaintiffs (speCifically 
Independent Mortgage) was aware of the Gunters' deed of trust in the 
property, but Gunters were not aware of Independent Mortgage's claim to 
an interest in the property until well after the Gunters closed. Defendants 
Gunters filed an answer and demanded a jury tria/.. This matter is not yet 
set for a jury trial, 
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp .. 1-2, 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 
(2001).. A party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new 
evidence, but is not required to do so .. Johnson v, Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 
100 (CtApp .. 2006). A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order of the trial 
court may be made at any time before entry of the final judgment, but not later than 
fourteen days after entry of the final judgment.. I..R.C.P., 11 (A)(2)(B). 
III. ANALYSIS. 
In denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court wrote in its July 24, 
2009, Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: "Because there is a dispute 
over a material issue of fact as to whether PI;tt!t~e the initial encumbrancer or the 
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subsequent encumbrancer, as compared to Gunters, plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment must be denied at this time." Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p .. 8. The Court's analysis was as follows: 
Idaho is a race-notice state. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained the purpose of the race-notice recording act: 
The purpose of the recording act in a race notice jurisdiction, 
like Idaho, is to allow recorded interests to be effective 
against unrecorded interests when the recorded interest is 
taken for a valuable consideration and in good faith, Le. 
without knowledge, either actual or constructive, that 
unrecorded interests exist. 
Froman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907) .. Where one 
purchases or encumbers with notice of inconsistent claims, one does not 
do so in good faith and similarly, where one fails to investigate open or 
obviously inconsistent claims, one cannot take in good faith. Langroise v. 
Becker, 96 Idaho 218,220,526 P2d 178. 180 (1974) (quoting Amerco, 
Inc. v. Tullar, 182 CaLApp.2d 336, 6 CaL Rptr., 7 (1960») .. Idaho Code § 
55-606 states: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one 
subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or 
encumberer, who in good faith, and for valuable 
consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument or 
valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded. 
Idaho Code § 55-812 is entitled Unrecorded Conveyance Void Against 
Subsequent Purchasers and reads, in relevant part: 
Every conveyance of real property ... is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, 
or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded. 
Here, the mortgage given to Independent Mortgage was recorded 
before the Gunters' interest. Motion for Summary Judgment, p .. 4; 
Defendants' Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 4-5. Gunters argue that they were without notice of 
Independent Mortgage's security interest, but that Independent Mortgage 
had notice of their interest. Defendants' Supplemental Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 4-5. Gunters argue 
Independent Mortgage, since it knew of Gunters' interest, "cannot be said 
to have acted in good faith in its actions." Id, citing Farm Bureau Finance 
Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745.747.-48.605 P.2d 509,511-512 (1980) 
("VVhen a subsequent encumberancer or purchaser has actual knowledge 
of a prior interest, it makes no difference whether the prior interest was 
properly acknowledged and recorded. I.C. §§ 55-606, 55-812.") As such, 
Gunters argue Independent Mortgage was not acting in good faith, i.e. 
"without knowledge." Id. It appears the)je,js no dispute that Independent 
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Oct.20. 2009 3:30PM FRIEDLANDER HAYNES MITCHELL STOW No.1726 p. 4/9 
Mortgage knew of Gunters' interest before Independent Mortgage loaned 
and directed the escrow agent (Easyway Escrow) to record Independent 
Mortgage's interest first. Supplemental Affidavit (of Casey S. Krivor) In 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 1l1l3, 4. 
Plaintiffs rely on /Estate of Skvorak v. Security Union Title Insurance 
Company •• 140 Idaho 16. 89 P.3d 856 (2004). for the proposition that 
where two purchase money mortgages compete for priority, the first to 
record is entitled to priority and whether the initial encumberer is a good 
faith purchaser is not relevant. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment. pp. 4-5. Skvorak involved the sale of a parcel 
known as "Gold Cup" from the Skvoraks to the purchasers the Sylvesters., 
The purchasers Sylvesters received the down payment amount from 
Crown Pacific and that amount was secured through a mortgage with 
Crown Pacific. 140 Idaho 16, 18, 89 P,,3d 856, 857. Later the same day, 
the Sylvesters executed a mortgage in favor of the Skvoraks to secure the 
balance. Id. Crown Pacific recorded its mortgage on January 19, 1995, 
and Skvoraks mortgage and warranty deed was recorded twelve days 
later on January 31, 1995. Id. In determining Crown Pacific's mortgage 
had priority, the Idaho Supreme Court noted Crown Pacific executed and 
recorded its mortgage twelve days before the Skvoraks and the Skvoraks 
were not good faith purchasers because they knew of the Crown Pacific 
Mortgage., 140 Idaho 16, 23, 89 P.3d 856, 863. 
Gunters argue Skvorak is inapposite as the factual difference 
between that case and the instant matter lies in the vendor in Skvorak (the 
Skvoraks) having notice of the third party purchase money mortgage, and 
the vendors in the instant case (Gunters) having been "completely 
unaware" of the third party mortgage: 
In Skvorakthe sellers of the real property were aware that 
the buyer was financing the remainder of the purchase price 
with a third party. In this case the sellers of the real property 
were not aware that the buyer was financing the remainder 
of the purchase price with a third party. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and in Response to Plaintiffs 
Reply memorandum, p. 4. Despite plaintiffs' argument, the Court in 
Skvorak determined that whether Crown Pacific was a good faith 
purchaser was irrelevant because it had recorded twelve days before the 
Skvoraks, but as to Idaho's recording statutes: 
Whether Crown Pacific is a good faith purchaser in this case 
is irrelevant because Crown Pacific was the initial 
encumbrancer. Therefore, these rules do not apply to 
Crown Pacific and to that extent the district court erred. 
140 Idaho 16, 22-23, 89 P.3d 856, 862-63. Thus, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's analysis in Skvorak revolved around which party was the "initial 
encumbrancer." Crown Pacific was the "initial encumbrancer', 
presumably because of the following sequence: 
The morning of January 13, 1995, the Sylvesters 
and Norm Suenkel (Suenkel), resource officer for Crown 
Pacific, met at Lamanna's 0~6l'1.:xecuted a mortgage 
Oct.20.2009 3:31PM FRIEDLANDER HAYNES MITCHELL STOW 
in favor of Crown Pacific for the. down payment. Lamanna 
and the Skvoraks were not present at this meeting, but Cox 
notarized the Crown Pacific mortgage. The Sylvesters also 
executed a promissory note for $450,075, a log purchase 
agreement. and a UCC-1 financing agreement, aI/ of which 
Crown Pacific prepared. Later that day, the Sylvesters 
returned to Lamanna's office and executed a mortgage in 
favor of the Skvoraks to secure payment on a promissory 
note for the balance. and accepted delivery of the deed. 
Cox also notarized this mortgage. Crown Pacific recorded 
its mortgage January 19, 1995. Linda Skvorak recorded the 
Skvoraks' mortgage and warranty deed on January 31, 
1995. 
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140 Idaho 16.18,89 P.3d 856, 858. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Skvorak then analyzed whether Skvoraks, a subsequent mortgagee 
(though still a purchase money mortgagee) were good faith purchasers. 
140 Idaho 16, 22-23, 89 P.3d 856, 862-63. The district court had found 
that there was sufficient evidence that the Skvoraks knew of the Crown 
Pacific mortgage interest and did not take as a good faith purchaser, and 
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld that finding .. 140 Idaho 16. 22.89 P.3d 
856,862. 
In the present case, the recordation of the two interests occurred 
within minutes of each other. But what is unclear, at least at this summary 
judgment juncture, Is who the initial mortgagee/encumberer is and who 
the subsequent mortgageeJencumberer is. 
It appears plaintiffs may be the subsequent 
mortgagees/encumberers based on their knowledge of the prior existing 
(yet at the time, unrecorded) deed of trust already encumbering the 
property at issue.. Casey S .. Krivor. Manager of Independent Mortgage, 
stated in his affidavit that Mr. Hazel [president of defendants Summit] 
asked Krivor if Independent Mortgage would finance 100% of the 
$799,000 purchase price for Summit to purchase this property from 
Gunters, and Krivor declined. advising Hazel that Independent Mortgate 
would not consider making a loan of more than 75% loan to value. 
Affidavit (of Casey S. Krivor) in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
p .. 2, 11 2. Kr;vor then stated: 
Mr. Hazel [president of defendants Summit] later advised me 
that the sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Gunter, had agreed to carry 
back $200,000 of the purchase price. A loan of $616,000 
was acceptable to IMLC [Independent Mortgage] since it 
would thus be protected by at least 25% in additional value" 
Id., ,. 3. 
However, it also appears Gunters may be the subsequent 
encumbrancers, since Gunters perhaps should have expected Summit 
was financing this purchase because Summit needed Gunters "help· in 
order to make this sale go through. Monica Gunter explains that she and 
her husband were under the " . :~~~nding that Summit, Inc .. , would be 
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paying cash without financing [other than Gunters agreeing to carry a 
$200,000 note on the property] the remainder of the balance due on the 
property." Affidavit of Monica Gunter. p. 2, 1J 4. That must be put in 
context with Monica Gunter's claim that in the original agreement between 
Gunters and Summit, Summit would be paying the entire sales price and 
that: 
The Agreement did not provide for a financing contingency 
for the buyer Summit. Inc. It was our understanding that 
Summit, Inc. would be paying cash at closing for the 
property without financing. 
Affidavit of Monica Gunter, p. 2, 11 3. The Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement does state thatthe balance (other than the $1,000 earnest 
money) would be paid as follows: "cash at closing". Id., Exhibit 1. "Cash 
at closing" would occur even if there were financing. The form itself does 
not provide for a financing contingency (or no financing contingency), so 
Gunters argument is not overly persuasive. 
The exhibits provided do not answer the question" Plaintiffs claim 
defendants executed a note in favor of plaintiffs on June 19, 2006 .. 
Complaint, p. 3, 118. However, the note between defendants and Gunters 
is likewise dated June 19. 2006. Affidavit of Monica Gunter. p .. 3.117, 
Exhibit 5,. 
At summary judgment, this court cannot determine who is the initial 
mortgagee/encumberer is and who the subsequent 
mortgageelencumberer. That being the key distinguishing factor in 
Skvorak, this Court cannot grant plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
at this time. There is dispute over this key material issue of fact. 
If plaintiffs are the initial encumbrancer, then it matters not if they 
knew of Gunters' interest. Plaintiffs would prevail over Gunters even 
though they knew of Gunters' interest. However, if plaintiffs are the 
subsequent encumbrancer, then plaintiffs did not act in good faith 
because they knew of Gunters' interest. In that sense, the issue of initial 
versus subsequent encumbrancer is not only a material issue of fact, it is 
a dispositive issue of material fact. 
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3-8. 
In this Court's Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, it reasoned 
pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Skvorak v. Security Union 
Title Ins. Co"' 140 Idaho 16, 89 P.,3d 856 (2004), a disputed issue of material fact 
remained as to whether plaintiffs or the defendants Gunters were the initial 
encumbrancer" Accordingly, this Court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.. 
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for SUr.!:!6(' #~gment, p .. 8. This Court noted the 
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recordation of the two interests in this matter occurred within moments of each other 
Id., p. 6.. Plaintiffs may have been the subsequent encumbrancer based on their 
knowledge of a prior-existing, but unrecorded. deed of trust already being in place.ld. 
However, Gunters may also have been the subsequent encumbrancer because they 
"perhaps should have expected Summit was financing this purchase because Summit 
needed Gunters' 'help' in order to make this sale go through .. " Id., p .. 7. 
Plaintiffs move for reconsideration, arguing that this Court erred in distinguishing 
between an "initial encumbrancer" and the first party to record. Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p .. 2. Plaintiffs argue that although generally the 
first party to record does not take in good faith when the party has actual or constructive 
notice of a prior existing claim, Estate of Skvorak makes knowledge of an existing claim 
irrelevant where two purchase-money mortgages are involved .. Id., p .. 3. "The rules that 
would otherwise pertain to knowledge of another's senior interest do not apply when 
dealing with two or more purchase money mortgages .. " Id. And, "a sampling of the 
express language [the Idaho Supreme Court1 used makes it crystal clear that 'initial 
encumberancer' means the first encumbrancer to record and nothing else".. Id. 
In response, Gunters argue the reasoning in Estate of Skvorak must be limited to 
cases involving similar facts. that is. two purchase money mortgagors who are both not 
good faith encumbrancers because each had notice of the other. Memorandum in 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. p .. 2. "Unlike [Estate of] Skvorak, 
this case involve$ a dispute over the priority of two purchase money encumbrancers 
where only one encumberancer had notice of the other .. " Id., p .. 3. Gunters state Estate 
of Skvorak stands for the proposition that only where neither of two purchase money 
mortgagors are good faith encu~!r~7i:s is priority established by who records first 
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Id., pp. 2-3 .. 
This Court is being asked, again, to determine whether the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Estate of Skvorak is equally applicable here, The facts in Estate of Skvorak, 
as argued by Gunters, differ from the facts of the instant case.. In Estate of Skvorak, 
the District Court determined both purchase money mortgagors had notice of each 
other's mortgages prior to recording and at issue was the priority between two purchase 
money mortgages executed in the same transaction. 140 Idaho 16, 19,89 P,.3d 856, 
859. The Supreme Court determined that the rule that one who purchases or 
encumbers with notice of an inconsistent claim does not take in good faith was 
inapplicable to the Skvoraks, who recorded twelve days after defendants/appellants and 
had knowledge of defendants/appellants' plans and intent to advance the down 
payment amount 140 Idaho 16,22,89 P .. 3d 856,862. 
In the instant case, to the extent there remains a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether Gunters had constructive knowledge of plaintiffs' recordation, denial of 
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was proper. While plaintiffs argue Gunters had 
such knowledge because plaintiffs recorded first (Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, p. 4, n .. 1), mere seconds elapsed between the two recordations in 
this case and there would have likely been no computer entry or other record of 
plaintiffs' filing available to Gunters,. It is likely unreasonable to require the recording 
clerk to recognize a filing as being applicable to one filed seconds later and to so notify 
the subsequent filer, the Gunters. It is even more unreasonable to require such 
recognition, Jet alone appreciation of such by Gunters. Plaintiffs have set forth no 
evidence to establish that Gunters had actual knowledge of the first-recorded mortgage. 
The instant facts vary from Estate of Skvorak in that there has been no finding here that 
-~fJ5-
both encumbrances were part of the same transaction or that "the vendor has notice of 
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the third party's mortgage and [the third party purchase money mortgage] was recorded 
first." See 140 Idaho 16, 22, 89 P,3d 856 (emphasis added). 
As aptly put by Gunters' counsel at oral argument, Idaho is a "race-notice" state, 
and Estate of Skvorak discusses the "race" component of that statute since both parties 
were aware of each other and both parties were aware there was going to be two 
encumbrancers Thus, the "notice" component was not at issue in Estate of Skvorak., 
In the present case, there is at least a dispute of fact as to whether the Gunters had 
, notice of plaintiffs To adopt the result plaintiffs desire and to adopt plaintiffs' argument 
that this case is identical to Estate of Skvorak would turn Idaho's "race-notice" statute 
(Idaho Code § 55-606, Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3). into a 
"race" only statute. That is for the Idaho Legislature, and is not the province of this 
Court 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED .. 
Entered this 20th day of October, 2009" 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERBD AND THIS COURT DOES ORDER that the jury demand 
in the abovweferenced caso is waived and a courtlbench trial is to proceed as scheduled on 
March 15.2010. 
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PLAINTIFFS' TRIAL BRJEF - I ORIGINAL 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion for Reconsideration assumed 
for the purposes of their legal arguments that the Gunters did not have actual or imputed 
knowledge of plaintiffs' loan or their mortgage. While plaintiffs hope to convince this Court that 
it was in error when it denied plaintiffs' motions, the evidence in this case will also establish that 
the Gunters and/or their agent knew that Summitt was borrowing the remaining funds necessary 
to complete its purchase of the Gunters' property from plaintiffs' assignor, Independent 
Mortgage Ltd. Co. ("IMLC"), thus removing any question that plaintiffs have priority under that 
authority of Skvorak v. Security Union Title Insurance Company, 140 Idaho 16 (2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In April of 2006, Ron Hazel on behalf of his company, Summitt, Inc., entered into a one-
page purchase and sale agreement with the Gunters under which Summitt agreed to pay 
$799,000 for 16 acres ofland the Gunters owned in Bonner County (Exhibit 11), The contract 
contained a 30-day feasibility period which Mr. Hazel will testify was to enable him, inter alia, 
time to not only evaluate the property but to secure the financing he needed to complete the 
purchase. Mr. Hazel will specifically testify that he so notified the Gunters of his need for 
financing. 
Mr. Hazel had borrowed money on other occasions from IMLC, an equity lender in 
Sandpoint. In either April or May of 2006, Mr. Hazel approached Casey Krivor of IMLC 
seeking to borrow 100% of the purchase price. The request was denied since IMLC, like any 
responsible lender (especially equity lenders who rely on the value of the collateral in making 
their lending decisions), does not make loans unless there is value beyond the amount of their 
I All Exhibit references are to Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits. 
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lien in order to protect against loss in the event of foreclosure. Mr. Hazel was advised that IMLC 
would not loan more than $600,000 to finance Summitt's purchase. 
Mr. Hazel then advised the Gunters that he could not borrow 100% of the purchase price 
and would need them to carry back a $200,000 loan. They agreed and, as any seller would 
reasonably expect, knew their promissory note from Summitt would be secured by a deed of trust 
in second position. 
IMLC, naturally, had no direct contact with the Gunters during the escrow period, other 
than Casey Krivor was introduced to Mrs. Gunter on one occasion when she met Mr. Krivor and 
Mr. Hazel on the property. IMLC did, however, have numerous contacts with the Gunters' agent 
before escrow closed. 
Summitt and the Gunters elected to use an independent escrow agent, Easyway Escrow, 
in Sandpoint to handle their transaction. Easyway (now out of business) was owned and 
operated by a Carol Sommerfeld. From other transactions over the years, Ms. Sommerfeld was 
very familiar with IMLC and its business. She also knew ofIMLC's involvement in the 
transaction at issue in this case. While IMLC elected to have its note and mortgage2 signed by 
Summitt in its office and recorded directly by Sandpoint Title Insurance Company because it 
wanted title insurance for its loan, IMLC had occasion to communicate with Ms. Sommerfeld on 
several subjects before either loan closed. Several telephone calls were placed to Ms. 
Sommerfeld asking that she arrange for the Gunters to sign a subordination agreement? When 
she failed to timely respond, IMLC sent Easyway its check for $600,000 to fund the closing 
(Exhibit 2), but expressly instructed Sandpoint Title that its mortgage was to be recorded in first 
2 IMLC was required to use a mortgage instead ofa deed of trust because Summitt also pledged another 120-acre 
parcel as security for its loan. That other parcel was since lost to foreclosure by a senior lien. 
As a "belt and suspenders" matter, IMLC often asks for a subordination agreement from sellers carrying back a 
portion of the financing to avoid creative claims such as the Gunters are making in this case. 
-J,37 -
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position (Exhibit 7). In compliance, Ms. Sommerfeld gave the deed and the Gunters' deed of 
trust from Summitt to Sandpoint Title for recording without conflicting instructions. When the 
transaction closed, Easyway further acknowledged IMLC's loan by remitting its check to IMLC 
for a small overpayment in the loan proceeds IMLC had given it the day before (Exhibit 13). 
The Gunters did not voice any concerns, surprise or objections to their loan being in 
second position for several years. Instead, in November of2007, after the their note from 
Summitt had matured and while Summitt was in default, the Gunters granted Summitt an 
extension of the maturity date until June of2008 on condition that all interest be brought current 
by December 31, 2007 (Exhibit 14). In so doing, the Gunters also consented to a modification of 
the deed of trust in which they specifically reaffirmed all existing terms of the deed of trust not 
specifically modified (Exhibit 15). 
In December of2007, Mr. Hazel wrote a letter to the Gunters explaining that Summitt 
would not be able to make "any payments of interest or principal on [their] second mortgage" 
(Exhibit 16). Rather than object or voicing any opposition to being in second position behind 
IMLC's loan (by then assigned to plaintiffs), the Gunters entered into a secorid note and deed of 
trust modification agreement, which again extended the term of the note and otherwise 
reaffirmed the deed of trust (Exhibits 17 and 18). 
The evidence will also show that the Gunters even inquired of (and actually met with) 
IMLC on several occasions to discuss how they could protect themselves if plaintiffs foreclosed, 
During those discussion, the Gunters never once claimed that they thought they were in first 
position in terms of their security. Only after plaintiffs made it clear that they were proceeding 
to foreclosure and the Gunters secured legal counsel did their claim they knew nothing about 
IMLC or its loan surface. 
-~3??-
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LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A. The Court's Orders. In ruling on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, this 
Court correctly found that the decision in Estate ofSkvorak v. Security Union title Insurance 
Company, 140 Idaho 16 (2004) controls whether plaintiffs or the Gunters have lien priority. As 
the Court noted, the Skvorak decision clearly and unequivocally holds that the rules upon which 
the Gunters rely do not apply when the issue relates to the priority of two purchase money 
mortgages. 
When deciding plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, however, this Court believed that 
a genuine issue of material fact remained "as to whether Gunters had constructive knowledge of 
plaintiffs'recordation". This Court announced that it might be "unreasonable" to charge the 
Gunters with knowledge of plaintiffs' mortgage since "mere seconds elapsed between the two 
recordations" and it was perhaps unreasonable under those circumstances to "require the 
recording clerk to recognize" the significance of the earlier recording and so notify the Gunters. 
Since there would be no computer entry or other record of plaintiffs' mortgage in such a short 
time, the Gunters would have no way of checking the record and thus would not appreciate they 
were in second position. This Court thus distinguished Skvorak because of the finding in that 
case that the sellers had actual knowledge of the other purchase money mortgage. 
With due respect, this Court was wrong in its analysis of both Skvorak and Idaho's 
recording statutes. 
B. The Holding in Skvorak. The Skvorak Court unequivocally held that the "good 
faith" of the "initial encumbrancer" is irrelevant under Idaho's recording statutes. It also held that 
the actual knowledge of the sellers of the property involved in that case was not necessary for its 
decision. While finding that the trial court's conclusion they had actual knowledge was supported 
-bl3Cf-
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by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court specifically held in light of the sellers' continued 
denial they knew of the other mortgage that constructive notice precluded their claim that they 
were bona fide purchasers. The fact that Crown Pacific recorded first was determinative since its 
recording imparted constructive notice to the sellers. In so holding, the Supreme Court 
specifically stated: 
"Crown Pacific's third party purchase money mortgage for the amount of the 
down payment takes priority over the Skvoraks' vender purchase money 
mortgage for the balance of the purchase price because Crown Pacific recorded 
its mortgage first." (Id at 21; emphasis added) 
"The Crown Pacific mortgage takes priority over the Skvoraks because Crown 
Pacific recordedfirst." (Id at 22; emphasis added) 
"According to Idaho's recording statutes, a mortgage recorded first in time has 
priority against all other subsequent mortgagees". (Id at 23; emphasis added) 
"Because the Skvoraks did not recordjirst and had at least constructive 
knowledge of the Crown Pacific mortgage, Crown Pacific's mortgage takes 
priority." (Id; emphasis added). 
C. The Gunters Had "Constructive Notice" As A Matter of Law. Constructive notice 
does not depend on how long an instrument has been recorded or, in fact, if that instrument is 
properly recorded or indexed by the recorder's office. Constructive notice is imparted as an 
absolute matter of law the moment an instrument is given to the recorder for recording even if 
the recorder thereafter fails to discharge her statutory recording duties. 
Constructive notice is purely a matter of statute that does not depend on what this Court 
might believe is reasonable or fair (Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192,195 (2001)). Idaho 
Code § 55-811 unequivocally provides that an instrument conveying an interest in real property 
imparts constructive notice ''from the time it is jiled with the recorder". 
Demonstrating the point that the timing of a recording occurs immediately is the case of 
Miller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287 (2004). In Simonson, the plaintiff contended that she was not 
- J. YO-
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bound by CC&Rs of which she had no actual notice since the instrument had been improperly 
indexed by the recorder. She thus had no way of finding the CC&Rs by a title search since they 
were outside her chain of title. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, held that the plaintiff did 
have constructive notice of the CC&Rs and was bound by the covenants therein. The Court 
reasoned that Idaho's statutory scheme mandates that constructive notice be imparted as soon as 
an instrument is recorded (§ 55-811). A duly acknowledged instrument is deemed recorded 
under § 55-809 as soon as it is deposited with the recorder's office (Id at 289-90). As a result, 
even an instrument that is thereafter improperly filed for record or indexed by the recorder 
imparts constructive notice (Jd at 290). As succinctly stated by Justice Eismann in a concurring 
opinion - an instrument conveying an interest in real property imparts "constructive notice from 
the time it is filed 'with the recorder', not from the time it is filed or indexed by the recorder". 
Plaintiffs' mortgage thus gave the Gunters constructive notice of its existence the moment 
it was filed for record even though the Gunters would not have been able to find it in a search of 
their title. While that conclusion may seem unfair to this Court, it is not only mandated by the 
clear language of § 55-811, but the holdings of Simonson and Skvorak. That conclusion also 
does not make Idaho's statutory scheme a "race only" statute as this Court thought since the 
notice element ofIdaho's "race-notice" scheme exists as a matter of law the moment IMLC's 
mortgage was recorded. 
D. The Knowledge Of Their Agent Is Imputed To The Gunters. While plaintiffs 
believe the credible evidence in this case will convince the Court that the Gunters had actual 
knowledge of the pending loan from IMLC before escrow closed, the Gunters had at the very 
least another form of constructive notice that they cannot dodge. Their agent, Easyway Escrow, 
clearly knew ofIMLC's involvement and loan. 
-dJ./ 1-
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Summitt and the Gunters selected Easyway Escrow to handle the escrow functions of 
their sale; IMLC did not. Easyway was thus a dual agent of the buyer and sellers in that 
transaction. In that capacity, Easyway clearly knew ofIMLC's loan since it knew IMLC's 
business from prior transactions and accepted a deposit of $600,000 by check from IMLC to 
fund the purchase. 
The issue is therefore whether the knowledge of Easyway is imputed to the Gunters. 
That issue has not been addressed in Idaho, but it has in California, a state with virtually 
identical recording statutes and agency laws. In In Re Marriage of James and Dana Cloney, 91 
Cal.App.4th 429 (2001)4, the appellate court was presented with a situation where a money 
judgment against James Michael Cloney was properly recorded and thus a lien on any real 
property he owned. Years later, he took title to property in his nickname - Mike Cloney. As a 
result, the judgment was not detected by the title company when Cloney subsequently sold the 
property. When the judgment creditor attempted to execute on the property, the buyers 
contended that they did not have constructive notice of the judgment in light of the name 
differences. The California court did not need to address that issue, since it found the parties' 
escrow agent had seen the seller's driver's license bearing his legal name while notarizing 
documents to consummate the sale. The court held that the actual knowledge of the true legal 
name of the seller was imputed to the buyers who thus took title with constructive knowledge of 
the lien whether or not the recording statutes also gave constructive notice. 
The Cloney court recognized that an escrow agent serves dual masters and therefore 
reduced the analysis to two inquiries. First, was the information arguably imputed acquired in 
the course and scope of the agency? Second, was the information material to the subject matter 
of the agency (Jd at 438-440)? If both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the law 
4 Copy attached. 
-;l,/J-
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conclusively imputes knowledge to the agent's principal. Because the agent in Cloney acquired 
knowledge of the seller's legal name while acting in her capacity as an escrow agent and since 
that information was material to her duties, the agent's knowledge was constructively imparted 
to the buyers. 
The same is true in this case. Easyway Escrow had knowledge during the course of the 
transaction that Summitt was borrowing the balance of the purchase price. That information 
was acquired during the course and scope of its agency and material to its function as an escrow 
agent. Whether or not the Gunters had actual knowledge ofIMLC's loan and mortgage is thus 
irrelevant. The Gunters' agent knew and they are charged by law with that knowledge. 
E. The Gunters Have Waived And/Or Are Guilty Of Laches. With full knowledge 
of the fact IMLC' s mortgage was recorded ahead of their deed of trust, the Gunters did nothing 
to protect or establish their now-professed priority. Instead of taking action to foreclose on their 
deed of trust when their note matured while the market values of real property throughout this 
Country were falling, the Gunters kept their claim they had priority a secret from plaintiffs and 
gave Summitt multiple concessions and extensions while they formally acknowledged and 
reaffirmed the provisions of their deed of trust. 
The Gunters' failure to act and to enforce their supposed rights as senior lien holders 
severely prejudiced plaintiffs. Had the Gunters made their claims known, plaintiffs could have 
enforced their rights against the collateral as early as December of2006 while it still held value 
even if their mortgage was subordinate to the Gunters' deed of trust. The Gunters did not do so, 
leaving plaintiffs (if their lien is subordinate) without adequate security. 
A waiver of a right may be implied from conduct when a party fails to enforce that right 
to the prejudice of another party (Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwest Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
-f)J{J-
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110 Idaho 804, 806 (App. 1986)). Similarly, the doctrine of laches, a species of promissory 
estoppel, can preclude a party from enforcing a right when that party's lack of diligence results 
in prejudice to another party (Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 (App. 1991)). 
Dated: March 5, 2010 Dean & Kolts 
By ______________ ~~ __ 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
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INTRODUCTION· 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and their Motion for Reconsideration asswned 
for the purposes of their legal arguments that the Gunters did not have actual or imputed 
knowledge of plaintiffs' loan or their mortgage. While plaintiffs hope to convince this Court that 
it was in error when it denied plaintiffs' motions, the evidence in this case will also establish that 
the Gunters and/or their agent knew that Summitt was borrowing the remaining funds necessary 
to complete its purchase of the Gunters' property from plaintiffs' assignor, Independent 
Mortgage Ltd. Co. (uIMLC"), thus removing any question that plaintiffs have priority under that 
authority of Skvorakv. Security Union Title Insurance Company, 140 Idaho 16 (2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In April of2006, Ron Hazel on behalf of his company, Swnmitt, Inc., entered into a one-
page purchase and sale agreement with the Gunters under which Summitt agreed to pay 
$799,000 for 16 acres ofland the Gunters owned in BOlIDer County (Exhibit 1 \ The contract 
contained a 30-day feasibility period which Mr. Hazel will testify was to enable him, inter alia, 
time to not only evaluate the propertY but to secure the fmancing he needed to complete the 
purchase. Mr. Hazel will specifically testify that he so notified the Gunters of his need for 
financing. 
Mr. Hazel had borrowed money on other occasions from IMLC, an equity lender in 
Sandpoint. In either April or May of 2006, Mr. Hazel approached Casey Krivor ofIMLC 
seeking to borrow 100% of the purchase price. The request was denied since IMLC, like any 
responsible lender (especially equity lenders who rely on the value of the collateral in making 
their lending decisions). does not make loans unless there is value beyond the amount of their 
I All Exhibit references are to Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits. 
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lien in order to protect against loss in the event of foreclosure. Mr. Hazel was advised that IMLC 
would not loan more than $600,000 to finance Summitt's purchase. 
Mr. Hazel then advised the Gunters that he could not borrow 100% of the purchase price 
and would need them to carry back a $200,000 loan. They agreed and, as any seller would 
reasonably expect, knew their promissory note from Summitt would be secured by a deed oftl'USt 
in second position. 
IMLC, naturally, had no direct contact with the Gunters during the escrow period, other 
than Casey Krivor was introduced to Mrs. Gunter on one occasion when she met Mr. Krivor and 
Mr. Hazel on the property. IMLC did, however, have numerous contacts with the Gunters' agent 
before escrow closed. 
Summitt and the Gunters elected to use an independent escrow agent, Easyway Escrow, 
in Sandpoint to handle their transaction. Easyway (now out of business) was owned and 
operated by a Carol Sommerfeld. From other transactions over the years, Ms. Sommerfeld was 
very familiar with IMLC and its business. She also knew ofIMLC's involvement in the 
transaction at issue in this case. While IMLC elected to have its note and mortgage2 signed by 
Swnmitt in its office and recorded directly by Sandpoint Title Insurance Company because it 
wanted title insurance for its loan, IMLC had occasion to communicate with Ms. Sommerfeld on 
several subjects before either loan closed. Several telephone calls were placed to Ms. 
Sommerfeld asking that she arrange for the Gunters to sign a subordination agreement.3 When 
.she failed to timely respond, IMLC sent Easyway its check for $600,000 to fund the closing 
(Exhibit 2), but expressly instructed Sandpoint Title that its mortgage was to be recorded in first 
2 IMLC was required to use a mortgage instead of a deed of trust because Summitt also pledged another 120-acre 
farcel as security for its loan. That other parcel was since lost to foreclosure by a senior lien. 
As a "belt and suspenders" matter, IMT..C often asks for a subordination agreement from sellers clIJl)'ing back a 
portion of the financing to avoid creative claims such as the Gunters arc making in this case. 
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position (Exhibit 7), In compliance, Ms. Sommerfeld gave the deed and ~e Gunters' deed of 
trust from Summitt to Sandpoint Title for recording without conflicting instructions. When the 
transaction closed, Easyway further acknowledged IMLC' s loan by remitting its check to lMLC 
for a small overpayment in the loan proceeds IMLC had given it the day before (Exhibit 13). 
The Gunters did not voice any concerns, surprise or objections to their loan being in 
second position for several years. Instead, in November 01'2001, after the their note from 
Summitt had matured and while Summitt was in default, the Gunters granted Summitt an 
extension of the maturity date until June of2008 on condition that all interest be brought current 
by December 31, 2007 (Exhibit 14). In so doing, the Gunters also consented to a modification of 
the deed of trust in which they specifically reaffirmed aU existing terms of the deed of trust not 
specifically modified (Exhibit 15). 
In December of 2007, Mr. Hazel wrote a letter to the Gunters explaining that Summitt 
would not be able to make "any payments of interest or principal on [ their] second mortgage" 
(Exhibit 16). Rather than object or voicing any opposition to being in second position behind 
IMLC's loan (by then assigned to plaintiffs), the Gunters entered into a second note and deed of 
truSt modification agreement, which again extended the term of the note and otherwise 
reaffinned the deed of trust (Exhibits 17 and 18). 
The evidence will also show that the Gunters even inquired of (and actually met with) 
IMLC on several occasions to discuss how they could protect themselves if plaintiffs foreclosed, 
During those discussion, the Gunters never once claimed that they thought they were in first 
position in terms of their security. Only after plaintiffs made it clear that they were proceeding 
to foreclosure and the Gunters secured legal counsel did their claim they knew nothing about 
IMLC or its loan surface. 
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LEGAL AUTHORITY 
A. The Court's Orders. In ruling on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, this 
Court correctly found that the decision in Estate of Sk:voralc v. Security Union title Insurance 
Company, 140 Idaho 16 (2004) controls whether plaintiffs or the Gunters have lien priority. As 
the Court noted, the Slcvorak decision clearly and unequivocally holds that the rules upon which 
the GWlters rely do not apply when the issue relates to the priority of two purchase money 
mortgages. 
When deciding plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, however, this Court believed that 
a genuine issue of material fact remained "as to whether GWlters had constructive knowledge of 
plaintiffs' recordation". This Court announced that it might be "unreasonable" to charge the 
Gunters with knowledge of plaintiffs' mortgage since "mere seconds elapsed between the two 
recordations" and it was perhaps unreasonable under those circumstances to ''require the 
recording clerk to recognize" the significance of the earlier recording and so notify the Gunters. 
Since there would be no computer entry or other record of plaintiffs' mortgage in such a short 
time, the Gunters would have no way of checking the record and thus would not appreciate they 
were in second position. This Court thus distinguished Slcvorak because of the fmding in that 
case that the sellers had actual knowledge of the other purchase money mortgage. 
With due respect, this Court was wrong in its analysis of both Slcvorak and Idaho's 
recordin~ statutes. 
B. The Holding in Skvorak. The Slevorak Court unequivocally held that the "good 
faith" of the "initial encumbrancer" is irrelevant under Idaho's recording statutes. It also held that 
the actual knowledge of the sellers of the property involved in that case was not necessary for its 
decision. While fmding that the trial court's conclusion they had actual knowledge was supported 
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by substantial evidence, the Supreme Coun specifically held in light oftlle sellers' continued 
denial they knew of the other mortgage that constructive notice precluded their claim that they 
were bona fide purchasers. The fact that Crown Pacific recorded first was determinative since its 
recording imparted constructive notice to the sellers. In so holding, the Supreme Cowt 
specifically stated: 
"Crown Pacific's third party purchase money mortgage for the amount of the 
down payment takes priority over the Skvoraks' vender purchase money 
mortgage for the balance of the purchase price because Crown Pacific recorded 
its mortgage fi,.st." (ld at 21; emphasis added) 
"The Crown Pacific mortgage takes priority over the Skvoraks because Crown 
Pacific ,eco,.dedjint." (Id at 22; emphasis added) 
"According to Idaho's recording statutes, a mortgage recorded first in time has 
priority against all othe, subsequent mortgagees". (Id at 23; emphasis added) 
"Because the Skvoraks did not recordflrst and had at least constructive 
knowledge of the Crown Pacific mortgage, Crown Pacific's mortgage takes 
priority." (Id; emphasis added). 
C. The Gunters Had "Constructive Notice" As A Matter of Law. Constructive notice 
does not depend on how long an instrument has been recorded or, in fact, if that instrument is 
properly recorded or indexed by the recorder's office. Constructive notice is imparted as an 
absolute matter of law the moment an instrument is given to the recorder for recording even if 
the recorder thereafter fails to discharge her statutory recording duties. 
Constructive notice is purely a matter of statute that does not depend on what this Court 
might believe is reasonable or fair (Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195 (2001». Idaho 
Code § 55-811 unequivocally provides that an instrument conveying an interest in real property 
imparts constructive notice "from the time it is filed with the recorder". 
Demonstrating the point that the timing of a recording occurs immediately is the case of 
Miller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287 (2004). In Simonson, the plaintiff contended that she was not 
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bound by CC&Rs of which she had no actual notice since the instrument had been improperly 
indexed by the recorder. She thus had no way of finding the CC&Rs by a title search since they 
were outside her chain of title. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, held that the plaintiff did 
have constructive notice of the CC&Rs and was bound by the covenants therein. The Court 
reasoned that Idaho's statutory scheme mandates that constructive notice be imparted as soon as 
an instnunent is recorded (§ 55-811). A duly acknowledged instrument is deemed recorded 
under § 55-809 as soon as it is deposited with the recorder'S office (Id at 289-90). As a result, 
even an instrument that is thereafter improperly filed for record or indexed by the recorder 
imparts constructive notice (Id at 290). As succinctly stated by Justice Eismann in a concurring 
opinion - an instrument conveying an interest in real property imparts "constructive notice from 
the time it is filed 'with the recorder'. not from the time it is filed or indexed by the recorder". 
Plaintiffs' mortgage thus gave the Gunters constructive notice of its existence the moment 
it was filed for record even though the Gunters would not have been able to fmd it in a search of 
their title. While that conclusion may seem unfair to this Court, it is not only mandated by the 
clear language of § 55-811, but the holdings of Simonson and Skvorak. That conclusion also 
does not make Idaho's statutory scheme a "race only' statute as this Coun thought since the 
notice element ofIdaho's "race-notice" scheme exists as a matter oflaw the moment IMLC's 
mortgage was recorded. 
D. The Knowledge Of Their Agent Is Imputed To The Gunters. While plaintiffs 
believe the credible evidence in this case will convince the Court that the Gunters had actual 
knowledge of the pending loan from IMLC before escrow closed, the Gunters had at the very 
least another form of constructive notice that they cannot dodge. Their agent, Easyway Escrow, 
clearly knew ofIMLC's involvement and loan. 
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Summitt and the Gunters selected Easyway Escrow to handle the escrow functions of 
their sale; IMLC did not. Easyway was thus a dual agent of the buyer and sellers in that 
transaction. In that capacity, Easyway clearly knew ofIMLC's loan since it knew IMLC's 
business from prior transactions and accepted a deposit of $600.000 by check from IMLC to 
fund the purchase. 
The issue is therefore whether the knowledge ofEasyway is imputed to the Gunters. 
That issue has not been addressed in Idaho, but it has in California, a state with virtually 
identical recording statutes and agency laws. In In Re Mar,.iage of James and Dana Cloney, 91 
Cal.App.4th 429 (2001)4, the appellate court was presented with a situation where a money 
judgment against James Michael Cloney was properly recorded and thus a lien on any real 
property he owned. Years later. he took title to property in his nickname - Mike Cloney. As a 
result, the judgment was not detected by the title company when Cloney subsequently sold the 
property. When the judgment creditor attempted to execute on the property, the buyers 
contended that they did not have constructive notice of the judgment in light of the name 
differences. The California court did not need to address that issue, since it found the parties' 
escrow agent had seen the seller's driver's license bearing his legal name while notarizing 
documents to consummate the sale. The court held that the actual knowledge of the true legal 
name of the seller was imputed to the buyers who thus took title with constructive knowledge of 
the lien whether or not the recording statutes also gave constructive notice. 
The Cloney court recognized that an escrow agent serves dual masters and therefore 
reduced the analysis to two inquiries. First, was the infonnation arguably imputed acquired in 
the course and scope of the agency? Second, was the infonnation material to the subject matter 
of the agency (Id at 438-440)? If both questions are answered in the affinnative, then the law 
4 Copy attached 
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conclusively imputes knowledge to the agent's principal. Because the agent in Cloney acquired 
knowledge of the seller's legal name while acting in her capacity as an escrow agent and since 
that information was material to her duties, the agent's knowledge was constructively imparted 
to the buyers. 
The same is true in this case. Easyway Escrow had knowledge during the course of the 
transaction that Summitt was borrowing the balance of the purchase price. That information 
was acquired during the course and scope of its agency and material to its function as an escrow 
agent. Whether or not the Gunters had actual knowledge ofIMLC's loan and mortgage is thus 
irrelevant. The Gunters' agent knew and they are charged by law with that knOWledge. 
E. The Gunters Have Waived And/Or Are Guilty Of Laches. With full knowledge 
of the fact lMLC's mortgage was recorded ahead of their deed of trust, the Gunters did nothing 
to protect or establish their now-professed priority. Instead oftaldng action to foreclose on their 
deed of trust when their note matured while the market values of rea! property throughout this 
Cowttry were falling~ the Gunters kept their claim they had priority a secret from plaintiffs and 
gave Summitt multiple concessions and extensions while they formally acknowledged and 
reaffirmed the provisions of their deed of trust. 
The Gunters' failure to act and to enforce their supposed rights as senior lien holders 
severely prejudiced plaintiffs. Had the Gunters made their claims known, plaintiffs could have 
enforced their rights against the collateral as early as December of 2006 while it still held value 
even if their mortgage was subordinate to the Gunters' deed of trust. The Gunters did not do so, 
leaving plaintiffs (if their lien is subordinate) without adequate security. 
A waiver of a right may be implied from conduct when a party fails to enforce that right 
to the prejudice of another party (Idaho Migranl Council, Inc. v. Northwest MUlual Life Ins. Co., 
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110 Idaho 804, 806 (App. 1986». Similarly, the doctrine oflaches, a species of promissory 
estoppel, can preclude a party from enforcina a right when that party's lack of diligence results 
in prejudice to another party (Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 174 (App. 1991». 
Dated: June 21. 2010 Dean & Kolts 
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COUNTY OF BONNER 
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2010 JUN 22 P ill liS 
Attomeys for Defendants Patt:ick and Monica Gunter 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an 
unmarried man; HL T REAL ESTATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE 
EARLE·HENRION TRUST, Dated January 
27, 1998, sole and separate property of 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
Sp0l.1Se of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an 
individual; SUSAN BROIT, spouse of 
Daren Brott; and PATRICK GUNTER and 
MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-1538 
DEFENDANT GUNTERS' TRIAL 
BRIEF 
COME NOW Defendant Gunters by and through their attorneys of record, and hereby 
submit this Trial Brief in accordance with the Pretrial Order. 
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I. FACTS 
This matter comes to trial to detennine the priority of liens related to the purchase by 
Summit of eighteen (18) acres of real propelty from the Gunters. A purchase and sale 
agreement was signed between the parties on April 21, 2006, As part of that n'ansaction, the 
Gunters financed a portion of the purchase price by having Summit execute a promissory 
note and a deed of t11lst on the eighteen (18) acres, That deed of n1Jst was executed by Ron 
Hazel, the President ofSurnmit, Inc. on June 19,2006, at EasyWay Escrow. 
In a separate transaction, also on June 19, 2006, Summit bOll'OWed $616,000 from 
Plaintiff Independent Mortgage (IM), Summit, through Ron Hazel, its President, also signed 
a mortgage on one hundt'ed sixty (160) acres to secure the loan from 1M. Included in the one 
hundred sixty (160) acres was a description for the Gunters' eighteen (18) aCl'es, This loan 
transaction was not closed through EasyWay Escrow, but was closed separately by 
Independent M011gage. Summit used the monies borrowed from Independent Mortgage to 
pay part of the purchase price for the property purchased fi'Om the Gunters. 
EasyWay Escrow sent the documents related to the sale of the Chmters' eighteen (18) 
acres to Summit to Sandpoint Title for recording. Independent MOltgage also sent the 
documents related to Summit's m.ortgage of the one hundred sixty (160) acres to Sandpoint 
Title for recording. Sandpoint Title recorded the mortgage given by Summit on the one 
hundred sixty (160) acres one (1) minute before the deed of trust on the Guntel's' eighteen 
(18) acres was recorded. 
The IM mortgage could not have created an encumbrance on the Guntel's' eighteen 
(18) acres until Summit, as m011gagor, acquired title to the Gunters' property. See, Idaho 
Code § 45-907. The Gunters' deed oftl1lst was an encumbrance to secure the unpaid part of 
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the purchase price from Summit and was palt of the delivery of title from Gunter to Summit. 
This delivery took place at EasyWay Escrow, The IM mOltgage included ill its one hundred 
sixty (160) acre description, the eighteen (18) acres sold by Gunter. 
The outcome of this trial will be detennined based on which party the Court 
concludes was the first to encumber the eighteen (I8) acres. Other factual issues related to 
the priority of lien question are either agreed or easily established, For example, it is agreed 
that the 1M mortgage was recorded first. It is also agreed) or easily, established that 
Independent Mortgage was aware of the Summit deed of trust on the Gunters' eighteen (18) 
acres and, therefore, Independent Mortgage does not qualifY for protection as a bona fide 
purchaser for value (BFP). 
While the Gunters did not know abo'llt the separate u'ansaction whereby Summit 
bOlTOwed $600,000 from Independent MOltgage and gave Independent Mortgage a mortgage 
on one hundred sixty (160) acres, which amount included one hundred and forty-two (142) 
acres already owned by Summit and identified the eighteen (18) acres that Summit was 
buying from the Gunters. Gunters' knowledge or lack of knowledge of that transaction is not 
determinative of the lien priority issue. 
The lien priority question should be answered by a finding that the Oonters were the 
~rst encumbrancer of the pl'Opelty. If the Glmters are the first enc\unbrancer, their deed of 
trust must have priority because, even though the Independent MOltgage lien was recorded 
first, Independent Mortgage acquired its interest with knowledge of the Gunters' adverse 
claim to the property. This is true even if the 1M mortgage on the one hundred sixty (160) 
acres qualifies as a purchase money mortgage, competing with the Gunters' purchase money 
deed of tmst. Thus, Independent Mortgage does not qualify as a "good faith purchaser" and 
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the fact that its mortgage was recorded first does not give Independent Mortgage priority 
over an earlier encumbrance by Gunter. 
II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 
A. GUNTERS ARE THE FIRST ENCUMBRANCER. 
The evidence should show that Ron Hazel, President of Summit, Inc. signed both the 
Gunter deed of trust and the 1M m0l1gage at separate locations, but on the same day. If 
Hazel signed the deed of trust first, the Gunters' lien has first priority. However, even if 
Hazel signed the 1M mortgage first, the Gunters'1ien still has priority. 
The reason that the Gunters' deed of tl1lst has priority even if Hazel signed the 1M 
m011gage first is because the 1M mortgage would not have been a valid encumbrance on the 
Gunters' eighteen (18) acres since Summit, as the mortgagor, did not Own that property. For 
example, Idaho Code § 55-215(4) in referencing unlawful transfers, states that "[AJ tra1lsfer 
is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset u·ansfen·ed." 1M's mortgage does 
create security for the monies bon"owed by further encumbering the one hundred forty-two 
(142) acres previously acquired by Summit. Idaho law recognizes that even if the mortgagor 
(Summit) acquires title after the execution of the mortgage. the mortgagee (1M) will benefit 
from the additional security of the subsequently obtained property. Idaho Code § 45-907. 
That does not mean, however, that the additional security related to the after-acquired 
(property) title moves the lien priol'ity of the mOltgage ahead of an encumbrance made at the 
time of transfer. 
B. EASYWAY ESCROW IS NOT GUNTERS' AGENT. 
Plaintiffs contend that because EasyWay Escrow knew of the 1M's involvement, that 
is knowledge to Gunters and, therefore, because 1M recorded first, it has pliol'ity. There is no 
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factual or legal authority to support plaintiffs' contention and while an escrow company is 
not a general agent for purposes of imputing knowledge, this factual issue is in-elevant to the 
.Q.uestion of lien priority. 
An escrow agent is a neutral third party, in this case acting as a third party facilitator 
in connection with dle sale transaction between the buyer and seller of this property. IDAPA 
§ 18.0125.011 discusses and indicates in paragraph 02 that "an escrow agent shall act 
without partiality to any of the parties to the escrow." The Idaho Administrative Rules are 
consistent with the logical and common sense proposition that escrow officers and 
employees are, by their nature, not general agents of the parties to a transaction. There is no 
evidence that EasyWay Escrow was acting as an agent; EasyWay was merely the short-term 
escrow closer for Summit's purchase ofthe Gunters' property. 
Furthermore, the closing facilitated by EasyWay did not involve the 1M mortgage. 
The fact that Summit and Gunters used EasyWay as the escrow agent for the buyer and seller 
and that that closing did not involve the IM mortgage, underscores the separate nature of the 
transaction whereby Gunters sold the propelty and took a purchase money security interest. 
C. POST-SALE AND RECORDING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GUNTERS 
AND INDEPENDENT MORTGAGE ARE IRRELEVANT AND WOULD 
OTHERWISE BE INADMISSIBLE UNDER IDAHO RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 408. 
The plaintiffs seek to use discussions between Gunters and 1M after Summit defaulted 
as some evidence that Guntel's were aware of 1M's involvement prior to the closing of the 
real estate transaction. Although the post-default discussions are completely ilTelevant to 
question of lien priority, they are also, in this context, within the exclusion related to 
disc'llssions regarding compromise and settlement as contemplated by IRE 408. 
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D. THE GUNTERS' AGREEMENT TO EXTEND SUMMIT'S OBLIGATION 
ON THE NOTE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE W AlVER OF THE GUNTER'S 
PRIORITY CLAIM. 
Plaintiffs contend that Gunters' extension of SummWs obligation somehow supports 
an argument of laches or waiver that acts to 1M's benefit. The Gunters did not know of the 
1M mortgage and certainly never recognized that the 1M mortgage had first priority (although 
it does not matter whether they knew of the mortgage). Fw1helmore, the modification 
agl'eement entered into by Summit and the Ounters in OctoberlNovember of 2007 
specifically states that the grantor (Summit) "hereby represent and covenant that there are no 
judgments, liens or fi,rthel' encumbrances affecting the said real properties secured by the 
above-mentioned Deed ofTlllSt." (Emphasis added), This is also consistent with the Gunters' 
position that they were unaware of tIle 1M mortgage until the December 19, 2007 letter from 
Ron HazeL The obvious reasons for the extensions were that the Guntet·s were simply uying 
to avoid the costs and effort associated with foreclosure, 
Finally, it makes absolutely no difference whether a delay in foreclosing by a first lien 
holder will have a negative affect on a second lien holder because of a decline in property 
values. The second lien holder is in a position to protect themselves by starting foreclosure 
and buying out the underlying interest. 
E. OUNTERS' KNOWLEDGE OF THE 1M MORTGAGE, 
Whether the Gunters had actual knowledge of the separate 1M mortgage is in'elevant. 
Gunters' lack of knowledge of the 1M transaction is, however, consistent with the facts 
demonstrating that the two closings were separate tl'ansactions. The Gunters agreed to sell 
their eighteen (18) acres to Summit for $799,000. This transaction was closed at EasyWay 
Escrow, If the buyer was financing the acquisition of the property through a mortgage 
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company and the seller was aware that a mortgage company was providing the purchase 
money, one woqld expect that these transactions would all be closed together. In this 
instance, they were not. 
InitiaJly. the Gunters expected that Summit would pay cash for the property. Later, 
Summit president, Ron Hazel, told Monica Gunter that he could not come up with the full 
purchase price and he asked if the Gunters would finance $200,000. Although possibly 
disputed, it is the Gunters I position that until Ron Hazel sent the Gunters a Christmas card 
dated December 19, 2007, telling them that he was unable to make the payments on the 
promissOlY note and indicating that the Gunter loan was secured by a "second" mortgage, 
Hazel never told the Gunters that Summit was borrowing money from a third party and 
celtainly never suggested that the $200,000 canied by Gunters would be a second pl"iority 
loan. Although the facts will support a conclusion that the Gunters never had actual notice of 
the 1M mortgage, it simply does not matter whether Gunters knew of the IM mortgage or not. 
The 1M mOltgage was not part ofthe transaction closed at EasyWay and, by operation of law 
and logic, the 1M mortgage could not have encumbered the Gunters' eighteen (18) acres until 
after Summit owned that property. The transfer of the property to Summit was 
contemporaneous with the execution of the Gunters' Deed and Summit's Deed of Trust, not 
the execution ofIM's mortgage. Thus, 1M is the subsequent encumbrancer. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the fact that the 1M mortgage was recorded one minute ahead 
of the Gunter deed of nllst constitutes constructive notice to the Gunters. Again, notice of 
the 1M mortgage (a subsequent encumbrancer) is immaterial and not the issue in this case. 
This subject was also addressed in the briefing on summary judgment and it was pointed out 
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that if recording constitutes all notice, the race/notice aspect of Idaho's law would effectively 
be nothing more than to make Idaho a pure race-recording jurisdiction. 
III. CONCLUSION 
By executing a deed of trust when he closed the purchase and sale transaction for the 
Gunter eighteen (18) acres, Ron Hazel as president of Summit created a first encumbrance in 
favor of Gunters for that eighteen (18) acres. The fact that Ron Hazel separately negotiated 
and transacted an agreement with Independent Mortgage to borrow money by giving a 
mortgage on one hundred sixty (160) acres to secure a loan does not create an encumbrance 
on the Gunters' eighteen (18) acres at the time that mortgage was given, Independent 
Mortgage's encumbrance was valid at the time of execution as to the one hundred forty-two 
(142) acres owned by Summit, but only became valid as to the Gunters' eighteen (18) acres 
after the Summit land purchase transaction with Gunter closed. 
Based on the facts that will be established at trial, this Court should find that the 
Gunters are/were the first encumbrancer on the disputed property and are entitled to a first 
priority lien. Any foreclosure by pJaintiffs must take into account the Gunters as the flISt 
priority lien, J 
DATED this ~ day of June 2010. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, UP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an 
unmarried man; HL T REAL ESTATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January 
27, 1998, sole and separate property of 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of Daren 
Brott; and PATRICK GUNTER and MONICA 
GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-1538 
DEFENDANTS' CLOSING 
STATEMENT 
The issue before the Court is the priority between the Gunter Deed of Trust and the 
Independent Mortgage (1M) mortgage. To answer this question, the Court must decide which 
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security is the first encumbrance on the Gunter eighteen acres sold to Summit. If the Gunter 
Deed of Trust is the first encumbrance, that Deed of Trust has priority regardless of whether the 
IM mortgage was recorded first. It also does not matter whether the IM mortgage document 
was signed by Ron Hazel on behalf of Summit before Hazel signed the 1M mortgage. 
The Gunter Deed of Trust necessarily must be the first encumbrance because that deed 
of trust came into being as an encumbrance when the sale of land between Gunter and Summit 
occurred. The Gunter/Summit sale transaction was separate from the loan transaction between 
Summit and 1M. Thus, the creation of the Deed of Trust and the 1M mortgage was not part of 
"one continuous transaction" involving the purchase and sale of the Gunter eighteen acres. This 
is in contrast to the trial court's finding in Skvorak v. Security Union, 140 Idaho 16, 89 P.3d 
856,861 (2004). 
Like the situation in Skvorak, the case before this Court involved the priority of liens 
affecting property. In the Skvorak case, the vendor, Skvorak, sold real estate to a buyer, 
Sylvester. Skvorak financed a portion of the purchase price through a promissory note and took 
a mortgage as security. Sylvester also borrowed money from Crown Pacific against timber on 
the property and also gave Crown a mortgage. Both the land sale and the Crown mortgage 
were closed through the office of attorney Lamanna. The buyer, Sylvester, went the Lamanna 
office to execute all of the paperwork necessary for both the Skvorak land sale and the Crown 
mortgage. Sylvester signed both mortgages at the Lamanna office on the same day. The 
Crown mortgage was signed first and the Skvorak mortgage was signed later that day. The 
Crown mortgage was recorded first. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Skvorak concluded that the Crown mortgage was entitled 
to priority because Crown was the first encumbrancer of the land sold to Sylvester. Although 
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Crown recorded ftrst, that was not the detenninative ftnding from Svkorak. The analysis of 
whether the parties were "good faith purchasers" and the timing of recordation was part of a 
discussion by the Supreme Court as to whether Skvorak, as a second encumbrancer, could 
claim priority over Crown as the ftrst encumbrancer. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that 
because the Skvoraks had knowledge of the Crown mortgage and did not record fIrst, the 
Skvorak mortgage could not be given priority over the ftrst encumbrance. 
Thus, the Skvorak case turned on who was the fIrst encumbrancer. The recognition by 
the Supreme Court that Crown was the ftrst encumbrancer was based upon the trial court 
ftnding that the buyer, Sylvester, executed the Crown mortgage before he executed the Skvorak 
mortgage. Necessary to the detennination of "ftrst encumbrancer" was the conclusion by the 
trial judge that both mortgages were created as part of "one continuous transaction." The case 
before this Court is similar in some respects but very different because, unlike Skvorak, the 
Gunter/Summit purchase sale transaction was separate from the Summitt/1M loan transaction. 
The matter before this court does not involve "one continuous transaction." 
Because these are separate transactions and because the transfer of the eighteen acres 
from Gunter to Summitt occurs contemporaneous with the indebtedness to Gunter secured by 
the Deed of Trust, absent a subordination agreement, the Gunter Deed of Trust must be the ftrst 
encumbrance on the eighteen acres sold to Summitt. It does not matter whether Hazel signed 
the 1M mortgage document ftrst, that mortgage could not encumber the eighteen acres, because 
Summit did not own the eighteen acres when the mortgage was signed. 
It is also worth noting that the 1M mortgage described 160 acres, only 18 of which is the 
Gunter land. Summitt, the mortgagor, did at the time of execution, own 142 of the acreage 
described, but did not own the Gunter 18 acres. Consequently Hazel's execution of the 
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mortgage could not encumber the Gunter 18 acres until the real estate purchase and sale 
transaction was closed and the property transferred to Summitt. When the property was 
transferred to Summitt is was already subject to the Deed of Trust in favor of Gunter. 
It is undisputed that the land sale transaction closed separately from the Summit/1M loan 
and mortgage. Both Ron Hazel, the President of Summitt, and Monica Gunter testified that as 
part of the sale of the eighteen acres, they agreed to use EasyWay Escrow as the closer for this 
transaction. The purchase and sale agreement executed by the Gunters and Summit identifies 
the closer for both parties to be EasyWay Escrow. The purchase and sale agreement (Exhibit 1) 
indicated that the purchase price was to be paid "cash at closing" and set the closing date for 
June 19, 2006. In paragraph 7 of that agreement, possession was delivered to buyer "at 
closing." Although the agreement did give the buyer approximately one month to determine 
"feasibility" of the purchase, there was no financing contingency or other mention of any loan 
being pursued by the buyer. 
The only other document discussing the purchase and sale terms was Monica Gunter's 
notes taken as part of a telephone conversation with Ron Hazel regarding the Gunters carrying 
$200,000.00 of the purchase price. The notes are included as page 3 of Exhibit V. Nowhere in 
any of the documents contained in the entire closing file of EasyWay Escrow is there any 
mention of an 1M mortgage on the Gunter 18 acres. The Gunter/Summit land sale transaction 
must be a separate transaction and it stands on its own. 
Independent Mortgage also agrees that the Gunter/Summit transaction was closed 
separately from the Summit/1M loan transaction. Casey Krivor, manager for 1M, testified that 
1M did not close its transaction through EasyWay Escrow. Although he was aware that 
EasyWay Escrow was closing the land sale transaction, he testified that 1M did not use 
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EasyWay Escrow and that 1M closed its own loan transactions. Casey Krivor identified 
Stephanie Brown (formerly Reif) as 1M's in-house loan closer. 
Stephanie Brown also testified that she separately closed the 1M loan, mortgage and 
related documents. While Stephanie Brown did testify that she discussed with Carol 
Sommerfeld of EasyWay Escrow that Independent Mortgage was loaning money to Summit to 
acquire the Gunter 18 acres and that she believed Carol Sommerfeld knew that the loan would 
be secured by a first priority mortgage, there is no documentation to support 1M's or Ms. 
Brown's contention that EasyWay Escrow knew of the 1M loan to Summit and its mortgage. 
Again, the real estate closing file (Exhibit V) has no reference to 1M's third party 
mortgage, and Ms. Brown admitted in testimony that she did not send any of her closing 
documents, including recording instructions, to EasyWay Escrow. She also agreed that 1M's 
file does not have EasyWay Escrow's recording instructions or other documents from EasyWay 
related to the real estate closing. The separate closings of different transactions are not part of 
"one continuous transaction." 
Carol Sommerfeld of EasyWay Escrow testified that she received her instructions for the 
closing from the Purchase and Sale Agreement and from Monica Gunter's notes (Exhibit V, 
pages 2 and 3). Based upon those instructions, she provided the forms for the Warranty Deed, 
the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust to the parties to that transaction, Gunter and 
Summit. Ms. Sommerfeld also testified that the transaction was closed when all of the 
documents were executed and the purchase money was paid. Although she testified that she did 
receive a check for $600,000.00 drawn on 1M's account, it was not her responsibility to look 
into the source of the funds. Once the documents were signed and the monies received, the 
closing was completed. Ms. Sommerfeld testified that she was unaware that Summit was 
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mortgaging one hundred sixty (160) acres, including the eighteen (18) acres acquired from 
Gunter. Based on her experience working with Summit in the past, Carol Sommerfeld was 
aware that Summit owned a significant amount of property and that it had borrowed monies in 
the past by cross-collateralizing other properties. Carol Sommerfeld, as the closing agent for 
the real estate sale transaction, was unaware that Summit was giving a mortgage on the Gunter 
property. 
Carol Sommerfeld's testimony is supported by the EasyWay Escrow closing file. This 
can be illustrated by a hypothetical. If, for example, EasyWay Escrow actually was 
coordinating the closing of the land sale transaction with 1M's closing of its loan to Summit and 
a first mortgage on the Gunter land, one would expect to find some reference to this 
coordination and agreement by the parties in the real estate closing file. One would expect to 
see correspondence between .the closing agents discussing the loan and mortgage. One would 
expect to see some discussion of subordination or other agreement by the seller that the seller's 
deed of trust would be in second position. Instead, there is absolutely no correspondence, 
memoranda or other documented reference of such ''understanding'' or "coordination. " 
It is apparently 1M's position that EasyWay Escrow must have known of the IM 
mortgage because Carol Sommerfeld has closed numerous transactions for Summit that were 
financed by 1M, and she should know that 1M always takes a first position. 1M also points to 
the references to 1M in the EasyWay Escrow closing file related to the check for $600,000 and 
the refund to Summitt for an overpayment in the amount of $326.82 (pages 4 and 33 of Exhibit 
V). Ms. Sommerfeld testified that her file does not indicate that there was to be a mortgage on 
the Gunter property and she was not told of such by Stephanie Brown or anyone else with 1M. 
She clarified that even if Summitt had borrowed money from 1M, that does not indicate that a 
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mortgage would be placed on the eighteen acres. 
Monica Gunter testified that she and Pat understood the land sale transaction to be 
initially for the full cash purchase price. Later, Ron Hazel asked if they would carry 
$200,000.00. She testified that Ron Hazel never told her that he was borrowing money that 
would be secured by a mortgage, and that she and Pat did not have any knowledge of the 1M 
mortgage until after they received a Christmas card from Hazel in December of 2007 - a year 
and one-half after the real estate transaction closed. Monica testified that she and Pat would not 
have financed $200,000.00 of the purchase price if their note was in a second position. 
Ron Hazel testified in stark contrast to the testimony of Monica Gunter. Mr. Hazel's 
assertions that he told Monica Gunter that he was borrowing money from 1M and that the 
Gunter Deed of Trust would need to be subordinate or in second position to an 1M mortgage is 
not credible. Mr. Hazel's assertions are not supported by the exhibits or the other witnesses. 
First, there is no reference in the EasyWay Escrow closing file that Gunters knew about the 1M 
loan and mortgage. Second, the closing agent selected by both Hazel and Gunter did not know 
of the mortgage and testified that she was not told of such by Hazel. Third, the notes by Monica 
Gunter that she took during the phone conversation with Ron Hazel when he asked if the 
Gunters would carry back $200,000 of the purchase price (page 3 of exhibit V), do not have any 
reference to another loan, much less that the carry back financing would be in second position. 
There is also no evidence to corroborate Hazel's assertion that he had these discussions with 
Monica Gunter. Witnesses Krivor, Sommerfield and Brown testified that they had no 
information that Pat and Monica Gunter know of the 1M transaction at closing or prior to. 
Finally, Ron Hazel has an incentive to have the 1M mortgage in first position because he is 
personally liable on the debt to 1M; he has no such personal liability to Gunters (depo of Hazel 
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pg. 38, line 24-25; pg. 39, line 1-5). In short, Ron Hazel's testimony on this issue is not 
credible. 
Thus, the Court should make factual findings that 1) the real estate transaction between 
Summitt/Gunter was a separate transaction from the Summitt/1M loan transaction; 2) that the 
Warranty Deed, the Deed of Trust and the IM loan and Mortgage were not part of one 
continuous transaction; 3) that when the Summitt/Gunter sale closed, the transfer of ownership 
of the Gunter's property to Summitt came with the contemporaneous Deed of Trust in favor of 
Gunter; 4) the Gunter Deed of Trust created an encumbrance on the 18 acres before the 1M 
Mortgage encumbered the property; 5) the Gunter Deed of Trust was the first encumbrance on 
the 18 acres sold by Gunter to Summitt; and 6) the Gunter Deed of Trust has priority over the 
1M Mortgage. 
There are other, independent reasons that the Gunter Deed of Trust should have priority. 
The Gunter Deed of Trust has first priority because it is a ''purchase money" mortgage (deed of 
trust) and the 1M mortgage is not. Also, even if both encumbrances are purchase money 
mortgages and even if the Court were to find that the Deed of Trust and the Mortgage were part 
of one continuous transaction, they must be simultaneous and, because the Gunters have a 
vendor purchase money mortgage (deed of trust), that lien take priority over 1M's third-party 
purchase money mortgage. This last argument is based upon Restatement (Third) of Property 
Sec. 7.2, is made in good faith and with full knowledge that the Idaho Supreme Court 
previously rejected this argument in Skvorak. Although this Court does not need to consider 
this argument and should decide the matter based upon findings discussed above, the argument 
is made to preserve it if necessary. 
As additional, but not necessary, support for finding that Gunters were the first 
-d8;A-
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encumbrancer, the Court should also find that the 1M Mortgage was not a purchase money 
mortgage. Idaho Code § 45-112 defines a purchase money mortgage as "a mortgage given for 
the price of real property, at the time of conveyance." In this case (and unlike the mortgages in 
Skvorak) the 1M mortgage is not limited to the Gunter eighteen (18) acres. In fact, the 1M 
mortgage identifies 160 acres and is not, by its terms, specific to the Gunter land. The 1M 
mortgage was a mortgage given for security on 160 acres, 18 of which could not be encumbered 
at the time. 
SUMMARY 
Because the real estate purchase and sale and Independent Mortgage loan transactions 
are separate and not part of one continuous transaction the purchase money Deed of Trust in 
favor of Gunter must be the first encumbrance on the Gunter property sold to Summitt. As the 
first encumbrancer, the Gunter Deed of Trust is entitled to first priority. Independent Mortgage 
could, theoretically, have a first priority encumbrance if 1M was a "good faith" encumbrancer 
and recorded first. Although 1M did record its Mortgage first, the 1M Mortgage cannot have 
priority over the Gunter Deed of Trust, because 1M knew of the Gunter fmancing and Deed of 
Trust and, therefore, is not a "good faith" encumbrancer. See, Idaho Code § 55-812. 
Defendant Gunter has proposed a number of findings of fact and conclusions, not all of 
which are necessary to decide this matter. The critical findings from those proposed by Gunter 
are that the transactions are separate, that the encumbrances were not part of one continuous 
transaction, that even if the Mortgage was signed before the Deed of Trust, the Deed of Trust 
encumbrance took effect first, and that Independent Mortgage knew of the Gunter financing and 
Deed of Trust. These findings are supported by the record at trial and if the Court agrees, 
mandates the legal conclusion the Gunter Deed of Trust is in first priority, over the Mortgage 
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originally given to Independent Mortgage and now assigned to the Plaintiffs. 
~ 
DATED this L day of July, 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
) 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability ) 
Company, DONALD F. HUTTON, an ) 
unmarried man, et at, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SUMMITT, INC., an Idaho Corporation, ) 
RON HAZEL, an individual, etal., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
Case No.. S CV 2008 1538 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER FOLLOWING 
COURT TRIAL 
This matter was tried to the Court on June 28, 2010. Plaintiffs are the assignees 
of a promissory note in the amount of $616,000, assigned by Independent Mortgage 
Ltd .. Co .. (IMLC). and secured by a mortgage. Complaint, pp, 1-5 .. IMLC assigned the 
promissory note as follows: 11 % to plaintiff Insight LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability 
Company; 14% to plaintiff Donald Hutton; 25% to HLT Real Estate LLC an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company; 25% to plaintiff Earle-Henrion Trust, Dated January 27, 
1998, Sole and Separate Property of Daniel C. Earle; and 25% was retained by IMLC .. 
Complaint, pp. 3-4, 11 8. 
The borrower was defendant Summitt, Inc .. , who borrowed the money from IMLC 
to purchase real property from defendants Gunters. Gunters also financed $200,000 of 
Summitt's purchase price secured by a .E;;r~:1-trust. Summitt defaulted; this lawsuit 
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ensued" 
Plaintiffs were represented at trial by Charles R.. Dean. Jr" Defendants Patrick 
and Monica Gunter were represented by Marc A Lyons.. Defendants Summitt, Inc., Ron 
Hazel, Sarah Hazel, Daren Brott and Susan Brott did not appear, their defaults having 
been previously entered" The following factual summary is from this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
July 24, 2009: 
Because the other defendants have been defaulted, plaintiffs on 
April 7. 2008, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against 
defendants Patrick and Monica Gunter only. Plaintiffs are lenders and are 
owners and holders of a promissory note secured by a mortgage and by a 
deed of trust. Complaint, p. 2, 111. 
The Gunters sold the property at issue to Summitt, Inc., (Summitt) .. 
Gunters are owners and holders of a deed of trust securing some of the 
property at issue in the instant action. Complaint, p. 3, 1f 7. The Gunters 
financed a portion of Summitt's purchase and accepted a promiSSOry note 
for $200.000 from Summitt secured by the deed of trust. 
In June 2006, Summitt executed a note for $616,000 in favor of 
Independent Mortgage Ltd. Co. (IMLC); the note was secured by a 
mortgage recorded in first priority on June 19,2006. Complaint, pp. 3-5. 
1m 8-13. On October 10, 2008, plaintiffs initiated the foreclosure action at 
issue by filing this Complaint, after Summitt and guarantors Ron Hazel 
and Daren Brott defaulted. On April 7, 2008, plaintiffs filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment against defendants Patrick and Monica Gunter. 
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the issue of lien priority because 
Gunters claim they have the more senior secured interest because, 
although their interest was recorded after plaintiffs', plaintiffs (speCifically 
Independent Mortgage) was [were] aware of the Gunters' deed of trust in 
the property, but Gunters were not aware of Independent Mortgage's 
claim to an interest in the property until well after the Gunters closed. 
Defendants Gunters filed an answer and demanded a jury trial.. This 
matter is not yet set for a jury trial .. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 1-2. 
In their answer Gunters demanded a jury trial.. This Court denied plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, holding: "Because there is a dispute over a material issue of fact 
as to whether plaintiffs are the initial encumbrancer or the subsequent encumbrancer, 
as compared to Gunters, plaintiffs' Moti~n~fr ~~mary Judgment must be denied at 
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this time,," A motion to reconsider was filed by plaintiffs on August 3,2009. and this 
Court denied such motion in its October 20, 2009, "Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment n Much 
of that decision focused on this Court's analysis of the facts of this case (some of which 
the Court found to be in dispute) and the Idaho Supreme Court case of Estate of 
Skvorak v, Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 89 P3d 856 (2004). 
On March 3, 2010, the parties stipulated to try all matters to the Court .. Prior to 
the June 28, 2010, trial, both sides submitted Trial Briefs which the Court read in 
advance of trial.. Following trial, the Court requested additional briefing (closing 
argument) argument and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law be filed. 
Both sides timely submitted such, and the Court has reviewed those pleadings. 
Following the Court trial. there remained factual issues to be resolved, as set 
forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment at page eight: 
At summary judgment, this court cannot determine who is the initial 
mortgagee/encumberer is and who the subsequent 
mortgagee/encumberer. That being the key distinguishing factor in 
Skvorak, this Court cannot grant plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
at this time. There is dispute over this key material issue of fact. 
If plaintiffs are the initial encumbrancer, then it matters not if they 
knew of Gunters' interest. Plaintiffs would prevail over Gunters even 
though they knew of Gunters' interest. However. if plaintiffs are the 
subsequent encumbrancer, then plaintiffs did not act in good faith because 
they knew of Gunters' interest. In that sense, the issue of initial versus 
subsequent encumbrancer is not only a material issue of fact. it is a 
dispositive issue of material fact. 
Another issue for trail was whether Gunters had knowledge of plaintiffs' loan and 
promissory note at the time the Gunters gave their deed of trust.. If· that were proven at 
trial, it would result in Gunters not being a lender in good faith. Also up for 
consideration following the court trial i: 15J~!.. there should be any change in this 
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Court's interpretation of Skvorak, in light of the fact findings following the court trial. 
II. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES. 
Plaintiffs argue: 
When this Court distinguished Skvorak in denying plaintiffs' Motion 
for Reconsideration, it did not have the benefit of briefing on the issue of 
when constructive notice is imparted. While plaintiffs can appreciate the 
Court's concern about fairness of charging the Gunters with such notice, 
the law is exact. Fairness aside, the Gunters had notice as a matter of 
law the moment plaintiffs' mortgage was presented to the recorder for 
recording. 
Constructive notice does not depend on how long an instrument 
has been recorded or, in fact, if that instrument is properly recorded or 
indexed by the recorder's office. Constructive notice is imparted as an 
absolute matter of law the moment an instrument is given to the recorder 
for recording even if the recorder thereafter fails to discharge her statutory 
recording duties. 
Constructive notice is purely a matter of statute that does not 
depend on what might seem reasonable or fair (Kalange v. Rencher, 136 
Idaho 192, 195 (2001 »). Idaho Code § 55-811 unequivocally provides that 
an instrument conveying an interest in real property imparts constructive 
notice "from the time it is filed with the recordet'. 
Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief, pp. 5-6. This Court has read Kalange several times and 
cannot find anywhere in that opinion where the Idaho Supreme Court stated anything 
close to constructive notice not depending "on what might seem reasonable or fair," To 
the contrary, the Idaho Supreme Court in Kalange held: 
The primary purpose of the recording statues is to give notice to 
others that an interest is claimed in real property. The design of the 
recording statutes compels the recording of instruments affecting title, for 
the ultimate purpose of permitting purchasers to rely upon the record title, 
In addition to giving notice to others that an interest is claimed in real 
property, the recording statues give protection against bona fide third 
parties who may be dealing in the same property. S88 Haugh v., Smelick, 
126 Idaho 481,887 P.2d 26 (1993), quoting Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 
758,761,572 P2d 861, 864 (1977). 
136 Idaho 192. 196,30 P.3d 970, 974" In the present case, the party to which plaintiffs 
seek to ascribe notice to under the recording statute is not an "other" or a "purchaser" 
(to whom "the primary purpose" is directed,vnder Ka/ange) , but is instead the seller of 
-~ ?/g-
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the property. the current owners (at the time of the sale), the Gunters. At the moment 
of sale, of what fact do Gunters need constructive notice? They own the property, they 
need no constructive notice of that fact.. 
Perhaps there is a reason plaintiffs argue "constructive notice is purely a matter 
of statute that does not depend on what might seem reasonable or fair", even when that 
concept cannot be ascribed to the text of an Idaho Supreme Court decision, To follow 
plaintiffs logic, reasonableness and fairness would need to be entirely disregarded" 
This is because plaintiffs essentially argue the recording statutes give the seller, who 
carries a note on the property being sold, no protection from the lender to the buyer of 
the property, when that lender unilaterally and without telling the seller, directs the 
closer to record the lender's document first, mere seconds before the sellers' 
document. 
Again, of what fact do Gunters need constructive notice? Adopting plaintiffs' 
argument, the Gunters are in need of constructive notice of the fact that plaintiffs 
recorded their document first. Due to plaintiffs' interpretation of constructive notice, the 
sellers of the real property, the Gunters, are automatically in second place to the lender 
(plaintiffs). due only to the fact that the lender to the buyer (Summitt) of the property. 
unilaterally and without telling the seller, directed the closer to record the lender's 
document first, mere seconds before the sellers' document The period to which 
plaintiffs ascribe constructive notice covers in this case, would be measured in seconds. 
In the intervening seconds between the recording of plaintiffs' promissory note and the 
recording of Gunters' deed of trust, did Gunters even have an opportunity to check the 
recording statutes? That is the purpose of "constructive" notice.". it is notice "imparted 
from the record." KaJange, 136Ida~1~ ;95.30 P3d 970,973. However, in this 
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case, the notice imparted from the record existed for mere seconds between the 
moment plaintiffs recorded their promissory note and the moment Gunters deed of trust 
was recorded immediately after, at plaintiffs' direction.. 
It is important to note that the above quoted portion of Ka/ange reads: ". ... the 
recording statues give protection against bona fide third parties who may be dealing in 
the same property .. " 136 Idaho 192, 196,30 P3d 970,974 .. The following analysis 
found in this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment discusses the concepts of bona fide parties and good faith: 
Idaho is a race-notice state. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained the purpose of the race-notice recording act: 
The purpose of the recording act in a race notice jurisdiction, 
like Idaho, is to anow recorded interests to be effective 
against unrecorded interests when the recorded interest is 
taken for a valuable consideration and in good faith, Le. 
without knowledge, either actual or constructive, that 
unrecorded interests exist. 
Froman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907) .. Where one 
purchases or encumbers with notice of inconsistent claims, one does not 
do so in good faith and similarly, where one fails to investigate open or 
obviously inconsistent claims, one cannot take in good faith. Langrolse v .. 
Becker, 96 Idaho 218,220,526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974) (quoting Amerco, 
Inc. v. Tullar, 182 Cal..App.2d 336, 6 CaLRptr .. 7 (1960». Idaho Code § 
55-606 states.: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one 
subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser or 
encumberer, who in good faith, and for valuable 
consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument or 
valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded .. 
Idaho Code § 55·812 is entitled Unrecorded Conveyance Void Against 
Subsequent Purchasers and reads, in relevant part: 
Every conveyance of real property ... is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, 
or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration, whose convexance is first duly recorded .. 
-CJ.'1a-
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Here, the mortgage given to Independent Mortgage was recorded 
before the Gunters' interest. Motion for Summary Judgment, p .. 4; 
Defendants' Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 4·5. Gunters argue that they were without notice of 
Independent Mortgage's security interest, but that Independent Mortgage 
had notice of their interest. Defendants' Supplemental Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. pp. 4-5., Gunters argue 
Independent Mortgage, since it knew of Gunters' interest, "cannot be said 
to have acted in good faith in its actions." Id, citing Farm Bureau Finance 
Co., Inc, v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745,747-48,605 P.2d 509, 511-512 (1980) 
("When a subsequent encumberancer or purchaser has actual knowledge 
of a prior interest, it makes no difference whether the prior interest was 
properly acknowledged and recorded. I.e. §§ 55-606, 55-812 .. j As such, 
Gunters argue Independent Mortgage was not acting in good faith, i.e. 
"without knowledge. It Id It appears there is no dispute that Independent 
Mortgage knew of Gunters' interest before Independent Mortgage loaned 
and directed the escrow agent (Easyway Escrow) to record Independent 
Mortgage's interest first. Supplemental Affidavit (of Casey S Krivor) In 
Support of Motion for Summary JUdgment, p. 2, ~1l3, 4,. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3-4. 
(underlining added) Plaintiffs cannot take in "good faith" because they unequivocally 
had notice of Gunters' interest. Whether Gunters had knowledge of plaintiffs' 
predecessors (IMLC) interest, that is, whether Gunters sold to Summitt in good faith 
without knowledge of IMLC's interest, was one of the factual focal pOints of the Court 
trial, discussed in the next section,. 
This Court finds its analysis of Skvorak to be unchanged following trial. 
Accordingly, the Court reiterates its previous decision" First is that portion of the 
Court's decision on summary judgment included as follows: 
Plaintiffs rely on Estate of Skvorak v. Security Union Title Insurance 
Company, , 140 Idaho 16, 89 P.3d 856 (2004), for the proposition that 
where two purchase money mortgages compete for priority. the first to 
record is entitled to priority and whether the initial encumberer is a good 
faith purchaser is not relevant. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, pp. 4-5. Skvorak involved the sale of a parcel 
known as "Gold Cup" from the Skvoraks to the purchasers the Sylvesters" 
The purchasers Sylvesters received the down payment amount from 
Crown Pacific and that amount wa~ secured through a mortgage with 
-dC(/-
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Crown Pacific. 140 Idaho 16, 18,89 P.3d 856, 857. Later the same day, 
the Sylvesters executed a mortgage in favor of the Skvoraks to secure the 
balance. Id. Crown Pacific recorded its mortgage on January 19, 1995, 
and Skvoraks mortgage and warranty deed was recorded twelve days 
later on January 31, 1995. Id. In determining Crown Pacific's mortgage 
had priority, the Idaho Supreme Court noted Crown Pacific executed and 
recorded its mortgage twelve days before the Skvoraks and the Skvoraks 
were not good faith purchasers because they knew of the Crown Pacific 
Mortgage. 140 Idaho 16,23,89 P.3d 856,863. 
Gunters argue Skvorak is inapposite as the factual difference 
between that case and the instant matter lies in the vendor in Skvorak (the 
Skvoraks) having notice of the third party purchase money mortgage, and 
the vendors in the instant case (Gunters) having been "completely 
unawarell of the third party mortgage: 
In Skvorak the sellers of the real property were aware that 
the buyer was financing the remainder of the purchase price 
with a third party. In this case the sellers of the real property 
were not aware that the buyer was financing the remainder 
of the purchase price with a third party. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike and in Response to Plaintiff's 
Reply memorandum, p. 4. Despite plaintiffs' argument, the Court in 
Skvorak determined that whether Crown Pacific was a good faith 
purchaser was irrelevant because it had recorded twelve days before the 
Skvoraks, but as to Idaho's recording statutes: 
Whether Crown Pacific is a good faith purchaser in this case 
is irrelevant because Crown Pacific was the initial 
encumbrancer. Therefore, these rules do not apply to 
Crown Pacific and to that extent the district court erred. 
140 Idaho 16, 22-23, 89 P.3d 856,862-63. Thus, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's analysis in Skvorak revolved around which party was the "initial 
encumbrancer. II Crown Pacific was the "initial encumbrancer", 
presumably because of the following sequence: 
The morning of January 13, 1995, the Sylvesters and 
Norm Suenkel {Suenke~, resource officer for Crown Pacific, 
met at Lamanna's office and executed a mortgage in favor 
of Crown Pacific for the down payment. Lamanna and the 
Skvoraks were not present at this meeting, but Cox 
notarized the Crown Pacific mortgage. The Sylvesters also 
executed a promissory note for $450,075, a log purchase 
agreement, and a UCC-1 financing agreement, all of which 
Crown Pacific prepared. Later that day, the Sylvesters 
returned to Lamanna's office and executed a mortgage in 
favor of the Skvoraks to secure payment on a promissory 
note for the balance, and accepted delivery of the deed. Cox 
also notarized this mortgage" Crown Pacific recorded its 
mortgage January 19, 1995. Linda Skvorak recorded the 
Skvoraks' mortgage and warranty deed on January 31, 
1995.. -().. q d. -
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140 Idaho 16, 18,89 P.3d 856,858. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Skvorak then analyzed whether Skvoraks, a subsequent mortgagee 
(though still a purchase money mortgagee) were good faith purchasers. 
140 Idaho 16. 22-23, 89 P.3d 856,862-63. The district court had found 
that there was sufficient evidence that the Skvoraks knew of the Crown 
Pacific mortgage interest and did not take as a good faith purchaser. and 
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld that finding. 140 Idaho 16, 22. 89 P .. 3d 
856,862. 
In the present case, the recordation of the two interests occurred 
within minutes of each other. But what is unclear, at least at this summary 
judgment juncture, is who the initial mortgagee/encumberer is and who 
the subsequent mortgagee/encumberer is. 
It appears plaintiffs may be the subsequent 
mortgagees/encumberers based on their knowledge of the prior eXisting 
(yet at the time, unrecorded) deed of trust already encumbering the 
property at issue. Casey S. Krivor, Manager of Independent Mortgage, 
stated in his affidavit that Mr. Hazel [president of defendants Summitt] 
asked Krivor if Independent Mortgage would finance 100% of the 
$799,000 purchase price for Summitt to purchase this property from 
Gunters, and Krivor declined, adVising Hazel that Independent Mortgate 
would not consider making a loan of more than 75% loan to value" 
Affidavit (of Casey S. Krivor) in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 2, 11 2. Krivor then stated: 
Mr. Hazel [president of defendants Summitt] later advised 
me that the sellers. Mr. and Mrs. Gunter, had agreed to carry 
back $200,000 of the purchase price. A loan of $616,000 
was acceptable to IMLC [Independent Mortgage] since it 
would thus be protected by at least 25% in additional value, 
Id., 1f 3. 
However, it also appears Gunters may be the subsequent 
encumbrancers, since Gunters perhaps should have expected Summitt 
was financing this purchase because Summitt needed Gunters "help" in 
order to make this sale go through. Monica Gunter explains that she and 
her husband were under the ..... understanding that Summitt, Inc., would 
be paying cash without financing [other than Gunters agreeing to carry a 
$200,000 note on the property] the remainder of the balance due on the 
property." Affidavit of Monica Gunter, p .. 2, 1f 4. That must be put in 
context with Monica Gunter's claim that in the original agreement between 
Gunters and Summitt, Summitt would be paying the entire sales price and 
that: 
The Agreement did not provide for a financing contingency 
for the buyer Summitt, Inc. It was our understanding that 
Summitt, Inc. would be paying cash at closing for the 
property without finanCing. 
Affidavit of Monica Gunter, p. 2, 113. The Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement does state that the balance (other than the $1,000 earnest 
money) would be paid as follows: "cash at closing". Id., Exhibit 1 .. "Cash 
-d1J-
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at closing" would occur even if there were financing. The form itself does 
not provide for a financing contingency (or no financing contingency), so 
Gunfers argument is not overly persuasive. 
The exhibits provided do not answer the question.. Plaintiffs claim 
defendants executed a note in favor of plaintiffs on June 19, 2006" 
Complaint, p. 3,11 8. However, the note between defendants and Gunters 
is likewise dated June 19,2006. Affidavit of Monica Gunter, p. 3, 11 7, 
Exhibit 5. 
At summary judgment, this court cannot determine who is the initial 
mortgagee/encumberer is and who the subsequent 
mortgagee/encumberer. That being the key distinguishing factor in 
Skvorak, this Court cannot grant plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
at this time. There is dispute over this key material issue of fact. 
If plaintiffs are the initial encumbrancer, then it matters not if they 
knew of Gunters' interest. Plaintiffs would prevail over Gunters even 
though they knew of Gunters' interest. However, if plaintiffs are the 
subsequent encumbrancer, then plaintiffs did not act in good faith 
because they knew of Gunters' interest. In that sense, the issue of initial 
versus subsequent encumbrancer is not only a material issue of fact, it is 
a dispositive issue of material fact. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp" 4-8 .. 
Second is that portion of this Court's analysis on plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration: 
In this Court's Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, it 
reasoned pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Estate of 
Skvorak v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 89 P.3d 856 
(2004), a disputed issue of material fact remained as to whether plaintiffs 
or the defendants Gunters were the initial encumbrancer. Accordingly, 
this Court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Order on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8. This Court noted the 
recordation of the two interests in this matter occurred within moments of 
each other. Id., p. 6. Plaintiffs may have been the subsequent 
encumbrancer based on their knowledge of a prior-existing, but 
unrecorded, deed of trust already being in place. Id. However, Gunters 
may also have been the subsequent encumbrancer because they 
"perhaps should have expected Summitt was financing this purchase 
because Summitt needed Gunters' 'help' in order to make this sale go 
through." Id., p. 7. 
Plaintiffs move for reconsideration, arguing that this Court erred in 
distinguishing between an "initial encumbrancer" and the first party to 
record. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2. 
Plaintiffs argue that although generally the first party to record does not 
take in good faith when the party has actual or constructive notice of a 
prior existing claim, Estate of Skvorak makes knowledge of an existing 
claim irrelevant where two purchase-money mortgages are involved. Id., 
p.3 .. "The rules that would othe~q1i-rtain to knowledge of another's 
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senior interest do not apply when dealing with two or more purchase 
money mortgages." Id, And, "a sampling of the express language [the 
Idaho Supreme Court] used makes it crystal clear that 'initial 
encumberancer' means the first encumbrancer to record and nothing 
else"" Id. 
In response, Gunters argue the reasoning in Estate of Skvorak 
must be limited to cases involving similar facts, that is, two purchase 
money mortgagors who are both not good faith encumbrancers because 
each had notice of the other. Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2. "Unlike [Estate of] Skvorak, this case 
involves a dispute over the priority of two purchase money encumbrancers 
where only one encumberancer had notice of the other." Id.; p. 3. 
Gunters state Estate of Skvorak stands for the proposition that only where 
neither of two purchase money mortgagors are good faith encumbrancers 
is priority established by who records first. Id., pp. 2-3. 
This Court is being asked, again, to determine whether the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Estate of Skvorak is equally applicable here. 
The facts in Estate of Skvorak, as arg ued by Gunters, differ from the facts 
of the instant case. In Estate of Skvorak, the District Court determined 
both purchase money mortgagors had notice of each other's mortgages 
prior to recording and at issue was the priority between two purchase 
money mortgages executed in the same transaction. 140 Idaho 16, 19, 
89 P.3d 856,859. The Supreme Court determined that the rule that one 
who purchases or encumbers with notice of an inconsistent claim does 
not take in good faith was inapplicable to the Skvoraks, who recorded 
twelve days after defendants/appellants and had knowledge of 
defendants/appellants' plans and intent to advance the down payment 
amount. 140 Idaho 16,22,89 P.3d 856, 862. 
In the instant case, to the extent there remains a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether Gunters had constructive knowledge of plaintiffs' 
recordation, denial of plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was proper.. 
While plaintiffs argue Gunters had such knowledge because pjaintiffs 
recorded first (Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 
4, n" 1), mere seconds elapsed between the two recordations in this case 
and there would have likely been no computer entry or other record of 
plaintiffs' filing available to Gunters.. It is likely unreasonable to require the 
recording clerk to recognize a filing as being applicable to one filed 
seconds later and to so notify the subsequent filer, the Gunters. It is even 
more unreasonable to require such recognition, let alone appreCiation of 
such by Gunters. Plaintiffs have set forth no evidence to establish that 
Gunters had actual knowledge of the first-recorded mortgage. The instant 
facts vary from Estate of Skvorak in that there has been no finding here 
that both encumbrances were part of the same transaction or that "the 
vendor has notice of the third party's mortgage and [the third party 
purchase money mortgage] was recorded first" See 140 Idaho 16,22,89 
P.3d 856 (emphasis added). 
As aptly put by Gunters' counsel at oral argument, Idaho is a "race-
notice" state, and Estate of Skvorak discusses the "race" component of 
-dJ15-
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that statute since both parties were aware of each other and both parties 
were aware there was going to be two encumbrancers. Thus, the "notice" 
component was not at issue in Estate of Skvorak.. In the present case, 
there is at least a dispute of fact as to whether the Gunters had notice of 
plaintiffs. To adopt the result plaintiffs desire and to adopt plaintiffs' 
argument that this case is identical to Estate of Skvorak would turn 
Idaho's "race-notice" statute (Idaho Code § 55-606, Order on Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary JUdgment, p. 3), into a "race" only statute. That is for 
the Idaho Legislature. and is not the province of this Court. 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary JUdgment, pp. 6-9.. Third this Court finds, based on the above analySiS and 
based upon additional evidence presented at trial, that Gunters were the initial 
encumbrancer. This is not a situation like Skvorak where the seller did not record for 
quite some time later.. In the present case, this Court finds Gunters were kept in the dark 
as to any potential competing security interest in their property they were selling.. The 
Court finds Gunters were the initial encumbrancer because they owned the property, and 
until they agreed to sell that property, plaintiffs had nothing to encumber.. 
An issue not discussed by this Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment or in its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is the 
concept of "one continuous transaction" enunciated in Skvorak. Gunters raised this issue 
in both their pre-trial and post-trial briefing, Plaintiffs have not addressed this issue in 
their Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief" The pertinent portion of Skvorak reads: 
Both mortgages are clearly purchase money mortgages. Idaho Code § 45-
112, defines a purchase money mortgage as "a mortgage given for the 
price of real property, at the time of conveyance." In this case, Crown 
Pacific and the Skvoraks each received a mortgage for a portion of the 
price of Gold Cup and received the mortgage at the time of conveyance. 
Each party would have this Court find that the mortgages were created in 
separate transactions, however, we agree with the district court's finding 
that the deed and both mortgages were part of one continuous transaction 
involving the purchase of Gold Cup, 
-Jq&-
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Skvorak, 140 Idaho 16, 21, 89 P3d 856, 861.. (italics added) .. This Court finds no reason 
to disagree with the following set forth by Gunters in Defendant's Closing Statement: 
If the Gunter Deed of Trust is the first encumbrance, that Deed of Trust has 
priority regardless of whether the 1M mortgage was recorded first. It also 
does not matter whether the 1M mortgage document was signed by Ron 
Hazel on behalf of Summitt before Hazel signed the 1M mortgage. 
The Gunter Deed of Trust necessarily must be the first encumbrance 
because that deed of trust came into being as an encumbrance when the 
sale of land between Gunter and Summitt occurred. The Gunter/Summitt 
sale transaction was separate from the loan transaction between Summitt 
and 1M. Thus, the creation of the Deed of Trust and the 1M mortgage was 
not part of "one continuous transaction" involving the purchase and sale of 
the Gunter eighteen acres.. This is in contrast to the trial court's finding in 
Skvorak v. Security Union. 140 Idaho 16, 89 P.3d 856, 861 (2004). 
Like the situation in Skvorak, the case before this Court involved the 
priority of liens affecting property. In the Skvorak case, the vendor, 
Skvorak, sold real estate to a buyer, Sylvester. Skvorak financed a portion 
of the purchase price through a promissory note and took a mortgage as 
security. Sylvester also borrowed money from Crown Pacific against timber 
on the property and also gave Crown a mortgage. Both the land sale and 
the Crown mortgage were closed through the office of attorney Lamanna. 
The buyer, Sylvester, went to the Lamanna office to execute all of the 
paperwork necessary for both the Skvorak land sale and the Crown 
mortgage. Sylvester signed both mortgages at the Lamanna office on the 
same day. The Crown mortgage was signed first and the Skvorak 
mortgage was signed later that day.. The Crown mortgage was recorded 
first 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Skvorak concluded that the Crown 
mortgage was entitled to priority because Crown was the first 
encumbrancer of the land sold to Sylvester. Although Crown recorded first, 
that was not the determinative finding from Svkorak. The analysis of 
whether the parties were "good faith purchasers" and the timing of 
recordation was part of a discussion by the Supreme Court as to whether 
Skvorak, as a second encumbrancer. could claim priority over Crown as the 
first encumbrancer. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that because the 
Skvoraks had knowledge of the Crown mortgage and did not record first, 
the Skvorak mortgage could not be given priority over the first 
encumbrance. 
Thus, the Skvorak case turned on who was the first encumbrancer .. 
The recognition by the Supreme Court that Crown was the first 
encumbrancer was based upon the trial court finding that the buyer, 
Sylvester, executed the Crown mortgage before he executed the Skvorak 
mortgage. Necessary to the determination of "first encumbrancer" was the 
conclusion by the trial judge that both mortgages were created as part of 
"one continuous transaction." The case before this Court is similar in some 
respects but very different because, unlike Skvorak, the Gunter/Summitt 
-Jq7-
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purchase sale transaction was separate from the Summitt/1M loan 
transaction. The matter before this court does not involve "one continuous 
transaction ." 
Because these are separate transactions and because the transfer 
of the eighteen acres from Gunter to Summitt occurs contemporaneous 
with the indebtedness to Gunter secured by the Deed of Trust, absent a 
subordination agreement, the Gunter Deed of Trust must be the first 
encumbrance on the eighteen acres sold to Summitt. It does not matter 
whether Hazel signed the 1M mortgage document first, that mortgage could 
not encumber the eighteen acres, because Summitt did not own the 
eighteen acres when the mortgage was signed. 
It is also worth noting that the 1M mortgage described 160 acres, only 
18 of which is the Gunter land. Summitt. the mortgagor, did at the time of 
execution, own 142 of the acreage described, but did not own the Gunter 
18 acres. Consequently Hazel's execution of the mortgage could not 
encumber the Gunter 18 acres until the real estate purchase and sale 
transaction was closed and the property transferred to Summitt. When the 
property was transferred to Summitt is was already subject to the Deed of 
Trust in favor of Gunter. 
It is undisputed that the land sale transaction closed separately from 
the Summitt/1M loan and mortgage. Both Ron Hazel. the President of 
Summitt, and Monica Gunter testified that as part of the sale of the eighteen 
acres, they agreed to use EasyWay Escrow as the closer for this 
transaction. The purchase and sale agreement executed by the Gunters 
and Summitt identifies the closer for both parties to be EasyWay Escrow. 
The purchase and sale agreement (Exhibit 1) indicated that the purchase 
price was to be paid "cash at closing" and set the closing date for June 19, 
2006. In paragraph 7 of that agreement, possession was delivered to buyer 
"at closing." Although the agreement did give the buyer approximately one 
month to determine "feasibility" of the purchase, there was no financing 
contingency or other mention of any loan being pursued by the buyer. 
The only other document discussing the purchase and sale terms 
was Monica Gunter's notes taken as part of a telephone conversation with 
Ron Hazel regarding the Gunters carrying $200,000.00 of the purchase 
price. The notes are included as page 3 of Exhibit V. Nowhere in any of 
the documents contained in the entire closing file of EasyWay Escrow is 
there any mention of an 1M mortgage on the Gunter 18 acres. The 
Gunter/Summitt land sale transaction must be a separate transaction and it 
stands on its own. 
Independent Mortgage also agrees that the Gunter/Summitt 
transaction was closed separately from the Summitt/1M loan transaction. 
Casey Krivor, manager for 1M, testified that 1M did not close its transaction 
through EasyWay Escrow. Although he was aware that EasyWay Escrow 
was closing the land sale transaction, he testified that 1M did not use 
EasyWay Escrow and that 1M closed its own loan transactions. Casey 
Krivor identified Stephanie Brown (formerly Reif) as 1M's in-house loan 
closer.. -~q71-
Stephanie Brown also testified\nat she separately closed the 1M 
loan, mortgage and related documents.. While Stephanie Brown did testify 
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that she discussed with Carol Sommerfeld of EasyWay Escrow that 
Independent Mortgage was loaning money to Summitt to acquire the 
Gunter 1 B acres and that she believed Carol Sommerfeld knew that the 
loan would be secured by a first priority mortgage, there is no 
documentation to support 1M's or Ms. Brown's contention that EasyWay 
Escrow knew of the 1M loan to Summitt and its mortgage. 
Again, the real estate closing file (Exhibit V) has no reference to 1M's 
third party mortgage, and Ms. Brown admitted in testimony that she did not 
send any of her closing documents, including recording instructions, to 
EasyWay Escrow. She also agreed that 1M's file does not have EasyWay 
Escrow's recording instructions or other documents from EasyWay related 
to the real estate closing. The separate closings of different transactions 
are not part of "one continuous transaction." 
1t * * 
Thus, the Court should make factual findings that 1} the real estate 
transaction between Summitt/Gunter was a separate transaction from the 
Summitt/1M loan transaction; 2) that the Warranty Deed, the Deed of Trust 
and the 1M loan and Mortgage were not part of one continuous transaction; 
3) that when the Summitt/Gunter sale closed, the transfer of ownership of 
the Gunter's property to Summitt came with the contemporaneous Deed of 
Trust in favor of Gunter; 4) the Gunter Deed of Trust created an 
encumbrance on the 1 B acres before the 1M Mortgage encumbered the 
property; 5) the Gunter Deed of Trust was the first encumbrance on the 18 
acres sold by Gunter to Summitt; and 6) the Gunter Deed of Trust has 
priority over the 1M Mortgage .. 
Defendants' Closing Statement, pp .. 2-8.. This Court finds the Summitt/Gunter transaction 
occurred before the SummittllMLC transaction (the Gunter Deed of Trust was the first 
encumbrance because that deed of trust came into being as an encumbrance when the 
sale of land between Gunter and Summitt occurred) and was a separate transaction from 
the SummitVlMLC transaction because: they occurred at different times; they involved 
different acreage amounts; and they closed separately.. The Court finds the Gunter Deed 
of Trust was the first encumbrance. 
III. ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL ISSUES. 
Gunters argue: 
Monica Gunter testified that she and Pat understood the land sale 
transaction to be initially for the full cash purchase price. Later, Ron Hazel 
asked if they would carry $200,000.00. She testified that Ron Hazel never 
told her that he was borrOwing money that would be secured by a 
mortgage, and that she and Pat did_ ngi P!9-any knowledge of the 1M 
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mortgage until after they received a Christmas card from Hazel in 
December of 2007 ~ a year and one-hatf after the real estate transaction 
closed. Monica testified that she and Pat would not have financed 
$200,000.00 of the purchase price if their note was in a second position .. 
Ron Hazel testified in stark contrast to the testimony of Monica 
Gunter. Mr. Hazel's assertions that he told Monica Gunter that he was 
borrowing money from 1M and that the Gunter Deed of Trust would need to 
be subordinate or in second position to an 1M mortgage is not credible. Mr. 
Hazel's assertions are not supported by the exhibits or the other witnesses. 
First, there is no reference in the EasyWay Escrow closing fife that Gunters 
knew about the 1M loan and mortgage. Second, the clOSing agent selected 
by both Hazel and Gunter did not know of the mortgage and testified that 
she was not told of such by Hazel. Third, the notes by Monica Gunter that 
she took during the phone conversation with Ron Hazel when he asked if 
the Gunters would carry back $200,000 of the purchase price (page 3 of 
exhibit 'I), do not have any reference to another loan, much less that the 
carry back financing would be in second position. There is also no 
evidence to corroborate Hazel's assertion that he had these discussions 
with Monica Gunter. Witnesses Krivor, Sommerfield and Brown testified 
that they had no information that Pat and Monica Gunter know of the 1M 
transaction at closing or prior to. Finally, Ron Hazel has an incentive to 
have the 1M mortgage in first position because he is personally liable on the 
debt to 1M; he has no such personal liability to Gunters (depo of Hazel pg .. 
38, line 24-25; pg. 39, line 1-5). In short, Ron Hazel's testimony on this 
issue is not credible .. 
Defendants' Closing Statement. pp 7-8. On the other hand, plaintiffs argue: 
D. The Gunters Had Actual Knowledge Of Plaintiffs' Loan. The 
only disputed issue in this case, though not determinative of the priority 
issue under Skvorak, is the Gunters' claim that they did not know Summitt 
was borrowing money from IMLC. VVhile Mr. Gunter may not have 
appreCiated that fact and may never have been told given that his wife 
handled the transaction, Mrs. Gunter undoubtedly knew. To believe 
otherwise means that this Court would have to believe Mr. Hazel's 
testimony was perjured, that he instead hid the fact of IMLC's involvement 
from the Gunters, that Mr. Krivor was never identified to Mrs. Gunter as 
being from IMLC, that Stephanie Reif never contacted Sommerfeld to 
coordinate closings and money delivery, but instead aided Mr. Hazel in 
keeping IMLC's loan secret, and that Sommerfeld did not disclose her 
knowledge of IMLC's loan as the Gunters' agent and friend. The Gunters 
would also have to plausibly explain (1) why they did not foreclose when 
Summitt first defaulted if they truly thought they had $600,000 or so in 
equity in the property above their lien. (2) the absence of any claims about 
priority until this action began and (3) why, after admittedly learning of 
their junior position in December of 2007, they against extended the loan 
and modified their deed of trust. -.3tJO-
The more plausible scenario is tnat Mr. Hazel is not a crook, that 
he did in fact tell Mrs. Gunter he was borrowing from IMLC and introduced 
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Mr. Krivor to her as he testified, that IMLC processed its loan as usual and 
in so doing had several conversations with Sommerfeld who naturally 
would have kept the Gunters apprised, and that the Gunters were 
agreeable to taking a second position since they would realize almost 
$600,000 from the sale. . 
The Gunters should therefore be held to be just like the sellers in 
Skvorak - they had both actual and constructive knowledge of plaintiffs' 
loan and mortgage .. 
Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief, pp. 7-8. While this Court need not make the finding that 
Hazel's testimony was "perjured", this Court must make a credibility finding. This Court 
finds the testimony of Monica Gunter to be credible .. Why would Gunters go from what 
they initially thought was a full price cash sale to agreeing to financing $200,000 of the 
sale price and agreeing to be in second position regarding that $200,000? The Court 
finds that proposition to be incredible. And to the extent Hazel so testified, the Court 
finds him to be not credible. The Court finds credible Monica Gunter's testimony that 
she and Pat understood the land sale transaction to be initially for the full cash purchase 
price, but that later, Hazel asked if they would carry $200,000.00.. This Court finds 
credible Monica Gunter's testimony that Hazel never told her that he was borrowing 
money that would be secured by a mortgage, and that she and Pat did not have any 
knowledge of the 1M mortgage until after they received a Christmas card from Hazel in 
December of 2007 - a year and one-half after the real estate transaction closed .. 
The next issue to be discussed is "imputed knowledge".. Gunters argue: 
Carol Sommerfeld of EasyWay Escrow testified that she received 
her instructions for the closing from the Purchase and Sale Agreement and 
from Monica Gunter's notes (Exhibit v. pages 2 and 3). Based upon those 
instructions. she provided the forms for the Warranty Deed, the Promissory 
Note and the Deed of Trust to the parties to that transaction, Gunter and 
Summitt. Ms. Sommerfeld also testified that the transaction was closed 
when all of the documents were executed and the purchase money was 
paid. Although she testified that she did receive a check for $600,000.00 
drawn on 1M's account, it was not her responsibility to look into the source 
of the funds. Once the documents were signed and the monies received, 
the closing was completed., Ms. Sommerfeld testified that she was unaware 
that Summitt was mortgaging one hundred sixty (160) acres, including the -30/-
. . ~ 
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eighteen (18) acres acquired from Gunter. Based on her experience 
working with Summitt in the past, Carol Sommerfeld was aware that 
Summitt owned a significant amount of property and that it had borrowed 
monies in the past by cross-collateralizing other properties. Carol 
Sommerfeld, as the closing agent for the real estate sale transaction, was 
unaware that Summitt was giving a mortgage on the Gunter property. 
Carol Sommerfeld's testimony is supported by the EasyWay Escrow 
closing file. This can be illustrated by a hypothetical. If, for example, 
EasyWay Escrow actually was coordinating the closing of the land sale 
transaction with 1M's closing of its loan to Summitt and a first mortgage on 
the Gunter land, one would expect to find some reference to this 
coordination and agreement by the parties in the real estate closing file" 
One would expect to see correspondence between the closing agents 
discussing the loan and mortgage. One would expect to see some 
discussion of subordination or other agreement by the seller that the seller's 
deed of trust would be in second position. Instead, there is absolutely no 
correspondence, memoranda or other documented reference of such 
"understanding" or "coordination." 
It is apparently 1M's position that EasyWay Escrow must have known 
of the 1M mortgage because Carol Sommerfeld has closed numerous 
transactions for Summitt that were financed by 1M, and she should know 
that 1M always takes a first position.. 1M also points to the references to 1M 
in the EasyWay Escrow closing file related to the check for $600,000 and 
the refund to Summitt for an overpayment in the amount of $326.82 (pages 
4 and 33 of Exhibit V). Ms. Sommerfeld testified that her file does not 
indicate that there was to be a mortgage on the Gunter property and she 
was not told of such by Stephanie Brown or anyone else with 1M. She 
clarified that even if Summitt had borrowed money from 1M, that does not 
indicate that a mortgage would be placed on the eighteen acres. 
Defendants' Closing Statement, pp .. 5-7. Plaintiffs argue: 
E. The Gunters Had Imputed Knowledge. The testimony of 
Sommerfeld that she did not know about IMLC's loan was pure 
fabrication. Whether she was trying to help her friends or protect herself 
from a claim is uncertain, but what was certain is that she was not telling 
the truth. 
Sommerfeld knew IMLC was a hard money lender who loaned 
against the value of real property. She knew from 53 transactions 
spanning several years that IMLC processed and closed its loans 
independent of her escrow- She knew that the money she had to close 
the deal came from IMLC and knew it was a loan (See Exhibits 2, 13 and 
V). She knew from those 53 loans that IMLC virtually always took first 
position security in the property at issue. 
To claim as Sommerfeld did that she did not know or even suspect 
that IMLC would be taking a mortgage against the Gunters' property is 
fiction of the highest degree. Cementing that conclusion is her testimony 
that had IMLC been taking security in the property, Stephanie would have 
contacted her to coordinate closings, Though she claimed that did not - 3 oJ. -
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occur, the facts speak otherwise. A review of all of the closing documents 
(deed, mortgage, deed of trust, IMLC's check) all show they were 
signed/executed on June 191h• Since IMLC would not have drawn 
$600,000 and delivered it to Easyway without assuring itself that Easyway 
was ready to close the sale end of the transaction, the timing of those 
signings clearly establish that the "coordination" between Stephanie and 
Easyway did in fact occur, meaning, of course, that Sommerfeld knew full 
well Summitt was borrowing the balance of the purchase price from IMLC .. 
Summitt and the Gunters had selected Easyway Escrow to handle 
the escrow functions of their sale; IMLC did not. Easyway was thus a dual 
agent of the buyer and sellers in that transaction. The issue is therefore 
whether the knowledge of Easyway is imputed to the Gunters. That issue 
has not been addressed in Idaho, but it has in California, a state with 
virtually identical recording statutes and a~ency laws. In In Re Marriage 
of James and Dana Cloney, 91 Cal.AppA 429 (2001), the appellate court 
was presented with a situation where a money judgment against James 
Michael Cloney was properly recorded and thus a lien on any real 
property he owned .. Years later. he took title to property in his nickname-
Mike Cloney. As a result, the judgment was not detected by the title 
company when Cloney subsequently sold the property. When the 
judgment creditor attempted to execute on the property, the buyers 
contended that they did not have constructive notice of the judgment in 
light of the name differences. The California court did not need to 
address that issue, since it found the parties' escrow agent had seen the 
seller's driver's license bearing his legal name while notarizing documents 
to consummate the sale. The court held that the actual knowledge of the 
true legal name of the seller was imputed to the buyers who thus took title 
with constructive knowledge of the lien whether or not the recording 
statutes also gave constructive notice. 
The Cloney court recognized that an escrow agent serves dual 
masters and therefore reduced the analysis to two inquiries. First, was 
the information arguably imputed acquired in the course and scope of the 
agency? Second, was the information material to the subject matter of 
the agency (ld at 438-440)? If both questions are answered in the 
affirmative, then the law conclusively imputes knowledge to the agent's 
principal. Because the agent in Cloney acquired knowledge of the seller's 
legal name while acting in her capacity as an escrow agent and since that 
information was material to her duties, the agent's knowledge was 
constructively imparted to the buyers. 
The same is true in this case. Easyway Escrow had knowledge 
during the course of the transaction that Summitt was borrowing the 
balance of the purchase price. That information was acquired during the 
course and scope of its agency and material to its function as an escrow 
agent. Whether or not the Gunters had actual knowledge of IMLC's loan 
and mortgage is thus irrelevant. The Gunters' agent knew and they are 
charged by law with that knowledge .. 
Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief, pp. 8-10, This ~~~ ~dS that SommeJield, like the Gunters, 
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had no reason to know that this was anything other than a cash sale, save for the 
$200,000 the Gunters were carrying back. This makes C/oney inapposite. In Cloney, 
the agent knew of the seller's legal name.. Sommerfeld had seen no documentation, 
other than the check used to close the transaction (discussed below) was drawn on the 
account of IMLC.. The closing agent in Cloney had knowledge of a fact, the seller's 
legal name. In the present case, the closing agent, Sommerfeld, only had knowledge of 
whom a check was drawn upon, and plaintiffs ask this Court to inferthat Sommerfeld 
knew for a fact that IMLC therefore had a security interest in this transaction.. Because 
Sommerfeld knew of Hazel's prior history of "cross-collateralizing" (discussed below), 
and Sommerfeld's testimony in that regard is uncontradicted, that is an inference that 
simply cannot be made. 
Sommerfeld testified that there was no information given to her that the buyer 
Summitt was planning on mortgaging the property .. Sommerfeld testified Hazel never 
told him they borrowed or mortgaged this property.. While the funds to close the 
transaction were from IMLC, Sommerfeld testified "the check is money''. and she had 
no idea that just because the check was on an IMLC account, (Exhibit 'V', p .. 4), there 
was any security interest in IMLC on this property .. On cross-examination Sommerfeld 
testified she knew from that check that Summitt's funding came from IMLC, and she 
knew that IMLC was a "hard money lender" which usually took first positions. However, 
she mentioned that any loan could have been "cross-collateralized", that is, 
collateralized by other property. Sommerfeld testified that Hazel has a history of cross-
collateralizing with a lot of other property.. Hazel did not testify at trial. Hazel testified 
via deposition taken April 17, 2009. Court Exhibit 2. In fact, Hazel testified as president 
of Summitt that this very property was "cross-col1ateralized"~ 
-::!Jol/-
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the independent Mortgage financing was secured by property in addition 
to the Gunters' property? 
A. Independent Mortgage's first mortgage was cross-collateralized with 
the adjacent property. the Verhigh (phonetic) property, 142 acres, as a 
second mortgage, yes .. 
Ron Hazel Deposition, p .. 37. LI .. 13-19; p .. 10, LL 12-20. Casey Krivor, owner and 
manager of IMLC, testified that before Summitt bought the Gunters' property. Summitt 
had already owned the adjacent 142 acres .. Thus, not only is Sommerfeld's testimony 
regarding previous cross-collateralization uncontradicted, it is corroborated by Hazel, 
president of Summitt. The Court has reviewed the exhibits. There is nothing that would 
have made it clear to Sommerfeld that this property of Gunters was being used to 
secure all of the $600,000 or even part of the $600,000. Sommerfeld simply did not 
know of the arrangement between IMLC and Summitt. Sommerfeld testified that as the 
agent of the Gunters. she was not under any duty to inquire where Summitt was getting 
its funding. Sommerfeld testified "a check is a check .. " Sommerfeld testified that no 
one mentioned a subordination agreement before closing, and that she learned of the 
subordination agreement after recording had taken place, when she was asked by 
Sandpoint Title Company. Sommerfeld's testimony that the first she ever heard of any 
subordination agreement was after recording is corroborated by Casey Krivor's 
testimony.. Krivor, an owner and manager of IMLC, testified that this was the first 
transaction that IMLC had ever even attempted to get a subordination agreement upon, 
and that they did not get one here. Sommerfeld testified there was nothing in the 
documents she reviewed that showed the Gunters' deed of trust was in first or in 
second position because "I was only aware of the first position", that being the Gunters .. 
Sommerfeld testified she was aware of no information that the Gunters would have had 
regarding the IMLC promissory note, that is should have shown on the purchase and 
-300 -
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sale agreement and did not.. While Sommerfiled testified she knew Gunters since 
eighth grade, she also testified she knew Hazel as a personal friend.. Sommerfeld 
could not recall who asked her to close this part of the transaction, that it could have 
been Gunters, but she had also done a lot of work for Summitt during this time .. The 
Court finds Sommerfeld to be credible. 
Indeed, Kovor, owner and president of IMLC, corroborates Sommerfeld's lack of 
knowledge about the existence of any IMLC loan. Krivor testified that it would not be 
necessary for EasyWay to get our recording instructions to Sandpoint Title. That fact, 
testified to by Krivor, kept Sommerfeld in the dark. kept the existence of any loan by 
IMLC to Summitt in the dark, and kept IMLC's instructions to record IMLC's loan first in 
the dark .. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT. 
1 In April of 2006, Pat and Monica Gunter (Gunters) negotiated the sale of 
their 18 acre home site to Summitt, Inc, (Summitt) a property development company .. 
Because Pat Gunter was working during the relevant times, Monica Gunter handled all 
discussions and negotiation regarding the sale of the Gunter home site.. Summitt was 
represented in these negotiations by its President, Ron Hazel (Hazel). 
2. Summitt had recently acquired the 142-acre property that adjoined the 
Gunter 18 acres.. The Gunters had previously leased the same 142 acres from the 
prior owner for farming, in combination with their own 18 acres. Summitt planned to 
develop the property as a residential subdivision.. After Summitt purchased the 
adjoining 142-acre property and Gunters learned of the subdivision plan, the Gunters 
decided that they did not want to live on property surrounded by residential 
development.. 
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3. Monica Gunter contacted Hazel to inquire if Summitt was interested in 
purchasing the Gunters' home site to combine it with the development property. Hazel 
told Monica Gunter that Summitt wanted to buy the Gunter home site and the parties 
agreed on a price of $799,000 for the 18 acres .. On April 21 ,2006, a purchase and sale 
agreement was executed by Pat and Monica Gunter as Sellers and Hazel. on behalf of 
Summitt. as Buyer for purchase of the Gunters' 18-acre home site .. 
4.. The Purchase and Sale Agreement (exhibit 1) was prepared by Hazel and 
identified EasyWay Escrow as the closing agent for the parties to this transaction. The 
payment terms were $1,000 earnest money and the balance of the purchase price 
identified to be "cash at closing." The purchase and sale agreement specified that 
possession was to be delivered to the buyer "at cloSing," with a closing date of June 19. 
2006 .. 
5.. The purchase and sale agreement also specified that the "buyer ISummitt] 
shall have until 5-19-06 to determine the feasibility of this purchase .. It The purchase and 
sale agreement did not have a finanCing contingency and did not indicate that the buyer 
would use or was seeking third-party financing. 
6. Shortly after the execution of the purchase and sale agreement, Hazel 
contacted Monica Gunter and told her that Summitt could not come up with the full 
amount of the purchase price.. Hazel informed the Gunters that Summitt could pay 
$599,000 of the purchase price and asked if the Gunters would consider financing the 
remaining $200,000 of the purchase price .. The Gunters agreed, and Monica Gunter 
took notes of the conversation with Hazel regarding the agreement to finance $200.000 
of the purchase price. 
7. At Hazel's request, Monica Gunter delivered her written notes to the 
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file (Exhibit V, page 3) and do not mention or identify any other loan or financing 
contemplated by Summitt for the purchase of the Gunters' property" 
8. After execution of the purchase and sale agreement, Ron Hazel 
separately contacted Independent Mortgage (IMLC), an equity or hard money lender, to 
see if Independent Mortgage would loan the entire $799,000" IMLC's manager, Casey 
Krivor, went with Hazel and toured the Gunter 18 acres.. Although Krivor met Monica 
Gunter, she was not informed that Krivor represented a third-party lender.. Krivor was 
aware of Summitt's plans to include the Gunter 18 acres with the 142 acres in the 
development residential subdivision, and Krivor and Hazel discussed and recognized 
that the Gunter 18 acres would complement the existing 142-acre property for 
development.. 
9. IMLC agreed to loan Summitt $616,000., This loan was conditioned on 
Summitt executing a promissory note, with the principals of Summitt, Hazel and Daren 
Brott, executing personal guarantees .. Summitt was also to execute a mortgage on 160 
acres of land that included both 142 acres already owned by Summitt and the 18 acres 
being acquired by Summitt from Gunter" 
10" The purchase and sale transaction between Gunter and Summitt for the 
18 acres was closed separately from the loan transaction between Independent 
Mortgage and Summitt" Carol Sommerfeld, the Owner of EasyWay Escrow, closed the 
Gunter/Summitt transaction. Stephanie Rief (now Brown) as the in-house closer for 
IMLC, prepared all documents related to and closed the Summitt/Independent 
Mortgage loan transaction 
11" As part of its in-house closing, Independent Mortgage prepared 
assignments of interest to investors, a power of attorney to facilitate the assignments 
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and related documents. Independent Mortgage did not intend this closing to close the 
purchase and sale transaction between Summitt and Gunter. 
12. While the closing agents for both transactions used Sandpoint Title 
Insurance for recording services and to provide title insurance for each transaction. the 
closing file documentation for EasyWay Escrow does not reflect coordination of a single 
cloSing effort. The complete EasyWay Escrow file was admitted as Exhibit V and does 
not contain any references to a third-party mortgage .. 
13.. The Gunter/Summitt real estate sale transaction was closed by Carol 
Sommerfeld of EasyWay Escrow without her knowledge that the buyer. Summitt. was 
executing a promissory note to IMLC.. Sommerfeld was not aware of the mortgage that 
Summitt executed for the 160 acres of property as security for Independent Mortgage's 
loan to Summitt .. 
14.. The Gunters were not told by any representative of Independent Mortgage 
that Summitt was borrowing additional funds to purchase the 18 acres. The Gunters 
were unaware of the loan transaction between Summitt and Independent Mortgage 
prior to and at the time of the closing of the real estate purchase transaction .. 
15.. Although Hazel testified that he told Monica Gunter that Summitt was 
financing through IMLC, Monica Gunter disputes this and testified that prior to the 
closing on the sale of the 18 acres to Summittl Hazel never informed her of any 
financing other than the Gunters' $200.000 note. The Gunters testified that until they 
received a Christmas card in December of 2007, they were unaware of the IMLC 
Promissory Note and Mortgage. The Gunters' testimony is consistent with that of the 
closing agent with EasyWay Escrow, Carol Sommerfeld, and is consistent with the fact 
that there is no reference in the closing file or the notes taken by Monica Gunter of her 
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telephone conversation with Hazel about the carry back of $200,000 of the purchase 
price .. 
16. The testimony of Monica Gunter and Sommerfeld on the issue of whether .... , . 
Hazel informed them of the I MLC loan and mortgage is more credible,. The testimony 
of Monica Gunter and Carol Sommerfeld is supported by the exhibits, including the fact 
that there is no mention of the Independent Mortgage loan in Monica Gunter's 
contemporaneous notes of her phone discussion with Hazel, and there is no indication 
in the EasyWay Escrow file that Summitt was financing through IMLC and would 
encumber the 18 acres 
17. Casey Krivor of Independent Mortgage was aware of the Gunter Deed of 
Trust and that it would be an encumbrance on the 18 acres. Krivor instructed IMLC's 
closer, Stephanie Brown, that subordination of the Gunter Deed of Trust was 
necessary" IMLC did not prepare a subordination agreement, did not send 
correspondence to EasyWay Escrow regarding a subordination agreement and did not 
advise either EasyWay Escrow or the Gunters that IMLC was planning to have its 
encumbrance be in first position,. 
18, Although EasyWay Escrow and IMLC ordered title insurance through 
Sandpoint Title Insurance and sent recording instructions to Sandpoint Title, these 
actions were not part of the same transaction" Neither IMLC nor EasyWay Escrow 
knew of the other closing agency's recording instructions, 
19" The closing of the Gunter/Summitt real estate transaction was separate 
and independent from the closing of the SummittllMLC loan transaction, and these 
separate closings were not part of one continuous transaction. 
20,. The Gunter Deed of Trust became an encumbrance on the 18 acres at 
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21. Although Hazel signed the Mortgage document for the 160 acres before 
he signed the Deed of Trust, the Mortgage did not create an encumbrance on the 
Gunter 18 acres until after the Gunter/Summitt transaction closed. At the time Hazel 
signed the Mortgage. Summitt did not have any ownership interest in the 18 acres. 
22.. The Deed of Trust from Summitt to Gunter necessarily created an 
encumbrance on the 18 acres before the Mortgage to IMLC encumbered the 18 acres. 
23. IMLC instructed Sandpoint Title to record its Mortgage first. before the 
Gunters' Deed of Trust.. EasyWay Escrow was unaware of the Mortgage to IMLC and 
gave instructions to Sandpoint Title to record the Gunters' Warranty Deed and Deed of 
Trust The conflicting instructions support the Court's finding that the transactions were 
separate and not part of a continuous transaction 
24. Gunters were the first encumbrancers of the 18 acres which they sold to 
Summitt 
25 IMLC is not a purchase money mortgager; the loan to Summitt was 
secured by 142 acres owned by Summitt at the time of the loan. The 18 acres did not 
come within the mortgage security until after the real estate purchase and sale 
transaction with the Gunters closed. 
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
By executing a deed of trust when he closed the purchase and sale for Gunters' 
eighteen acres, Hazel. as president of Summitt, created a first encumbrance in favor of 
Gunters for that eighteen acres. The fact that Hazel separately negotioated and 
transacted an agreement with IMLC to borrow money by giving a mortgage on one 
hundred and sixty acres to secure a loan does not create an encumbrance on Gunters' 
eighteen acres at the time.that mortgage was given. IMLC's encumbrance was valid at 
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but only became valid as to the Gunters' eighteen acres after the Summitt land 
purchase transaction with Gunters had closed. 
Based upon the Court's finding that the real estate purchase and sale 
transaction was separate from the SummiWIMLC loan transaction and the finding that 
the Deed of Trust given to Gunter and the Mortgage executed in favor of IMLC were not 
part of one continuous transaction, the Court concludes that the Deed of Trust given to 
Gunter was the first encumbrance on the eighteen acres sold by Gunter to Summitt 
Although the Mortgage to IMLC was recorded first. IMLC was not a good faith 
purchaser because IMLC was aware of the Gunters' financing of the sale to Summitt 
and was aware that the Gunter financing was secured by a Deed of Trust. 
Because Gunters were the first encumbrancers of the real property sold to 
Summitt and because IMLC was not a good faith purchaser the Gunter Deed of Trust 
has priority over the Mortgage despite the fact that the Mortgage was recorded one 
minute before the Deed of Trust.. 
Entered this 2nd day of August, 2010. 
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IN TIm DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLCj an Idaho limited liability 
company; DONALD F. mITTON, an 
unmatl'ied man; HL T REAL ESTATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January 
27,1998, sole and separate property of 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO" an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROIT, an 
individual; SUSAN BROIT, spouse of 
Daren Brott; and PATRICK GUNTER and 
MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 08-1538 
FINAL JUDGMENT OF LmN 
PRIORITY AND RULE S4{b) 
CERTIFICATE 
This action came on for trial before the Courtj without a jury, on June 28, 2010, the 
Honorable John T, Mitchell) District Judge presiding. and the issues having been duly bied and 
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the Court having entered its decision, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision, Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Following Court Tria~ 
IT IS ORDERED, ADruDGED AND DECREED: 
That the Deed of Trust held by Defendants Pat and Monica Gunter on the real property 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, recorded as Instrwnent No. 706585, Records of 
Bonner Countyl Idaho is in first lien position as to the property described in Exhibit "At' and has 
priority over Plaintiff Independent Mortgage Ltd., CO.'s mortgage on the same property. 
recorded as Instrument No. 706584, Records of Bonner County, Idaho, 
There being no other matters in controversy, as Defendants Summit, Hazel and Brott 
were defaulted by Order of this Court on October 30,2008; 
IT IS FUR1HBR ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That Plaintiffs are entitled to foreclose upon the real property described herein. subject 
only to the lien rights of Defendants Pat and Monica Gunter and no other. 
DATED this S r-day of August 2010. 
hell, District Judge 
RULE S4(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order. it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(B), I.R.C.P., that the court has detellnined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the ently of a final judgment and that the comt has and does hereby 
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direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this -G.!:-day of _ Av<l" t., 1 ,2010, 
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Attorneys fOl' Defendants Pahick and Monica Gunter 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC) an Idaho limited liability 
company; DONALD F. HUTION; an 
unmarried man; HLT REAL ESTATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January 
27, 1998, solei and separate property of 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT 
MORTGAGE LTD, CO., an Idaho limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS,' 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of 
Daren Brott; and ~ATRICK. GUNTER and 
MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No" CV 08-1538 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND RULE 
54(b) CERTIFICATE 
This action came on for trial before the Court, without a jury, on June 28. 2010, the 
Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and 
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the Court having entered its decision, and for the reasons set forth in the COID1's Memorandum 
DecisIon> Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Following Court Trial, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADWDGED AND DECREED' 
L That the Deed of Trust held by Defendants Patrick and Monica Gunter on the 
real proPelty described in Exhibit A attached hereto (the "PropertyU), recorded as Instrument 
No. 706585, Records of Bonner County, Idaho is vaIidJ is in first lien position as to the 
Property, and has priolity over Plaintiffs' Mortgage on the Property ("Mortgage") recorded as 
Instrument No. 706584, Records of Bonner County, Idaho. 
2 That the Mortgage of the Plaintiffs is declared to be a valid and existing lien 
against the Property. 
3. That the Mortgage of the Plaintiffs is subject only to the lien for taxes levied and 
assessed against the Property and the Deed of Trust of Defendants Patrick and Monica Gunter, 
4. Those Defendants. Sununitt, Inc." Ron Haze~ Sarah Hazel) Dal'en Brott and 
Susan Brott, are in default on the promissory note secured by the Plaintiffs' MOltgage. As of 
August 9, 2010) the amount due and unpaid to Plaintiffs under said note is $856,470.28, plus 
costs and attorneys' fees. 
5. Plaintiffs' Mortgage shaH therefore be foreclosed, and Defendanrs~ Summitt, 
Inc.) Ron Hazel j Sarah Hazel, Daren Brott and Susan Brott) either as tenants, encumbrancers, 
mortgagees, purchasers 01' otbeIWise.l are barred and foreclosed of all right, title or claim upon 
or in the real properties described above and each and every part thereof. except as provided 
herein. 
6. That the SherUf of Bonner County, Idaho shall seize the Property and cause it to 
be sold at public sa,le according to the laws of the State of Idaho and the practice of this Court. 
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'When such sale of the Property OCCUI'S, the Propelty shall be sold subject to the Gunter Deed of 
Trust, described in paragraph 1 herein. 
1. The Sheriff shall .filSt apply the proceeds of the sale to the Sheriffs costs of sale 
and the payment of taxes assessed against said propelties, and thereafter pay the balance to 
Plaintiffs. Any remaining proceeds) if any there be~ shall then be paid to the Defendants, 
Summitt, Inc., Ron Hazel, Sarah Hazel, Daren Brott and Susan Brott 
8.. Defendants, Summitt. Inc", Ron Hazel, Sarah Hazel, Daren Brott and Susan 
Brott, shall remain responsible for any deficiencies which may remain after applyjng all 
proceeds from the sale of Property in amounts to be determined at a fair value hearing to be 
scheduled after completion of said sale. 
9. That Plaintiffs, or any other person may become a purchaser at the sale of said 
real property and the Sheriff shall execute a certificate of sale to said purchaser to the Property 
according to law, and, except as provided herein with respect to the Gunter Deed of Trust; that 
title of said purchaser to the Property is quieted against any and all claims of Defendants, 
Summitt, Inc, Ron Hazel, Sarah Hazel, Daren Brott and Susan Brott, and against each and evety 
other person claiming by, through or under thel'll, or any of them.. 
10. That this Court retains jurisdiction after entry of the decree of foreclosure for 
PUll)Oses of determining the fair market value of the Property as of the date of the foreclosure 
sale and the award of judgment against Defendants, Summitt, Inc., Ron Hazel, Sarah Hazel~ 
Daren Brott and Susan Brott, for any deficiency which remains after applying aU proceeds of 
sale. 
I I. That Defendants, Summitt, Inc., Ron Hazel, Sarah Hazel, Daren Brott and Susan 
Bl'Ott, have such rights to statutory redemption as provided by law. 
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DATED this rr -ttaay of August 2010. 
BVLE 5400 CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order, it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(B)~ I.R.GP" that the court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the COUlt has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this t1 t;rayof Av, Lrt b ,2010. 
'tchell, Distlict Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J5L day of AugUst 2010, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Catherine L. Dullea, Chtd, 
Attorney at Law 
101 N. Fourth Ave.) Ste. 204 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Charles R. Dean, Jr, 
DEAN & KOLTS 
2020 Lakewood Dr., Ste. 212 
Co em' dJAlene, ID 83814 
Marc A. Lyons 
RAMSDEN & L YONS\ UP 
POBox 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
_ ./'((S, MAIL 
__ HAND DEUVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
__ FACSIMILE (208) 265-1556 
/" U.S, MAIL 
-- HAND PEUVER.Ep 
__ OVERNIGHT MAlL 
__ FACSIMILE (208) 664-9844 
~,S.MAIL 
--
HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
__ FACSIMILE (208) 664-5884 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By. II t2L~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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Catherine L. Dullea, ISB # 5309 
Catherine L. Dullea, Chtd. 
101 N. 4th St., Suite 204 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 265-2276 / Fax (208) 265-1556 
Charles R. Dean, Jr., ISB #5763 
DEAN & KOLTS 
Attorneys at Law 
1110 West Park Place Suite 212 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
(208) 664-7794/ Fax (208) 664-9844 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability, 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an, 
unmarried man; HL T REAL ESTATE LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE, 
EARLE-HENRI ON TRUST, Dated January, 
27, 1998, sole and separate property of, 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT, 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited, 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON, 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an, 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of, 
DAREN BROTT; and PATRICK GUNTER 
and, MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
) Case No.: CV 08-1538 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment establishing the priority of their mortgage over that of 
the Gunters not only as a matter oflaw, but because the Gunters and/or their agent had actual 
knowledge of plaintiffs' mortgage when their deed of trust was recorded. 
In their Trial Brief, the Gunters argue for the first time in this case that their knowledge is 
irrelevant because they somehow are the "initial encumbrancer". That claim is directly contrary 
to law and the evidence at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Both Liens Are Purchase Money Mortgages. The Gunters suggest in their Trial 
Brief that the plaintiffs' mortgage is not purchase money since it was handled outside of the 
escrow at Easyway or, alternatively, because additional security was also taken in the adjoining 
142 acres. Neither position is remotely accurate. 
The Idaho Supreme Court was presented with identical claims in The Estate ofSkvorak v. 
Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16 (2003). In Skvorak, the third party lender prepared 
its own loan documents and apparently was responsible for recording them after the deed was 
recorded. The sellers also took responsibility for recording the mortgage they received to secure 
a portion of the purchase price, which they did 11 days after the third party mortgage was 
recorded. For some reason, both parties argued on appeal that the mortgages were created in 
separate transactions, as the Gunters assert. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding 
that "both mortgages were part of one continuous transaction involving the purchase of' the real 
property at issue in that case (Id at 21). The Supreme Court then concluded "both parties 
possessed purchase money mortgages" (Ie!). 
The Supreme Court also found no ambiguity in what constitutes a purchase money 
mortgage. Citing Idaho Code § 45-112, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchase money 
mortgage is "a mortgage given for the price of the real property, at the time of conveyance" (lei). 
A simple review of Exhibit V will reveal that every penny of the net proceeds of plaintiffs' loan 
was used to finance the purchase of the Gunters' property by Summitt, Inc. Easyway received 
all $600,000 of the net proceeds and paid $596,755.58 of those funds either to the Gunters or 
their existing lender. The balance covered the Gunters' costs of sale. No portion of the 
plaintiffs' loan was used for anything other than that purchase. The fact that plaintiffs' agent, 
Independent Mortgage, was sage enough to ask for additional security does not change the fact 
the proceeds of the loan were "given for the price of the real property, at the time of 
conveyance" . 
B. The Gunters' Knowledge Is Relevant. Apparently realizing that the law and the 
facts were against them on the issue of knowledge (see infra), the Gunters made a new argument 
in their Trial Brief - that they were the first to close, so whether or not they knew of Independent 
Mortgage's loan is irrelevant. For that reason, the Gunters got their friend, Carol Sommerfeld, to 
testify that their closing occurred on June 19,2006. While that claim fell apart on cross-
examination, I even if true, it gets the Gunters nowhere. The Skvorak decision unequivocally 
holds that the priorities of two purchase money mortgages are determined by which mortgagee 
recorded first, regardless of whether that mortgagee knew of the other lender (see infra). 
I The Court will recall that Sommerfeld admitted that she does not disburse funds, the last act necessary to complete 
a closing, until she is assured following the title company's date down that the deed and security instruments will 
record. She had to admit that her closing did not occur until late in the day of June 20th, the day her disbursement 
checks are dated. 
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C. Plaintiffs Are Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law. 2 In ruling on plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court correctly found that the decision in Estate ofSkvorak 
v. Security Union title Insurance Company, 140 Idaho 16 (2004) controls whether plaintiffs or the 
Gunters have lien priority. As the Court noted, the Skvorak decision clearly and unequivocally 
holds that the rules upon which the Gunters rely do not apply when the issue relates to the priority 
of two purchase money mortgages. 
When deciding plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, however, this Court believed that 
a genuine issue of material fact remained "as to whether Gunters had constructive knowledge of 
plaintiffs' recordation". This Court announced that it might be "unreasonable" to charge the 
Gunters with knowledge of plaintiffs' mortgage since "mere seconds elapsed between the two 
recordations" and it was perhaps unreasonable under those circumstances to "require the 
recording clerk to recognize" the significance of the earlier recording and so notify the Gunters. 
Since there would be no computer entry or other record of plaintiffs' mortgage in such a short 
time, the Gunters would have no way of checking the record and thus would not appreciate they 
were in second position. This Court thus distinguished Skvorak because of the finding in that 
case that the sellers had actual knowledge of the other purchase money mortgage. 
With due respect, this Court was mistaken in its analysis of both Skvorak and Idaho's 
recording statutes. 
The Skvorak Court unequivocally held that when dealing with two purchase money 
mortgages the "good faith" of the "initial encumbrancer" is irrelevant under Idaho's recording 
statutes. It also held that the actual knowledge of the sellers of the property involved in that case 
was not necessary for its decision. While finding that the trial court's conclusion they had actual 
2 This section is taken with minor changes from plaintiffs' Trial Brief to make it unnecessary to refer to multiple 
documents. 
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knowledge was supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court specifically held in light 
of the sellers' continued denial they knew of the other mortgage that constructive notice 
precluded their claim that they were bona fide purchasers. The fact that Crown Pacific recorded 
first was determinative since its recording imparted constructive notice to the sellers. In so 
holding, the Supreme Court specifically stated: 
"Crown Pacific's third party purchase money mortgage for the amount of the 
down payment takes priority over the Skvoraks' vender purchase money 
mortgage for the balance of the purchase price because Crown Pacific recorded 
its mortgage first. " (ld at 21; emphasis added) 
"The Crown Pacific mortgage takes priority over the Skvoraks because Crown 
Pacific recordedfirst." (ld at 22; emphasis added) 
"According to Idaho's recording statutes, a mortgage recorded first in time has 
priority against all other subsequent mortgagees". (ld at 23; emphasis added) 
"Because the Skvoraks did not record first and had at least constructive 
knowledge of the Crown Pacific mortgage, Crown Pacific's mortgage takes 
priority." (ld; emphasis added). 
The most direct statement of the Supreme Court on the issue is found in the "Conclusion" of the 
Skvorakopinion. There, the court summed up its holding into one sentence: "Under Idaho's 
recording statutes a purchase money mortgage recorded first in time has priority over a 
subsequent vendor purchase money mortgage" (ld at 23, emphasis added). 
When this Court distinguished Skvorak in denying plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, 
it did not have the benefit of briefing on the issue of when constructive notice is imparted. While 
plaintiffs can appreciate the Court's concern about fairness of charging the Gunters with such 
notice, the law is exact. Fairness aside, the Gunters had notice as a matter of law the moment 
plaintiffs' mortgage was presented to the recorder for recording. . 
Constructive notice does not depend on how long an instrument has been recorded or, in 
fact, if that instrument is properly recorded or indexed by the recorder's office. Constructive 
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notice is imparted as an absolute matter of law the moment an instrument is given to the recorder 
for recording even if the recorder thereafter fails to discharge her statutory recording duties. 
Constructive notice is purely a matter of statute that does not depend on what might seem 
reasonable or fair (Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195 (2001». Idaho Code § 55-811 
unequivocally provides that an instrument conveying an interest in real property imparts 
constructive notice ''from the time it is filed with the recorder". 
Demonstrating the point that the timing of a recording occurs immediately is the case of 
Miller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287 (2004). In Simonson, the plaintiff contended that she was not 
bound by CC&Rs of which she had no actual notice since the instrument had been improperly 
indexed by the recorder. She thus had no way of finding the CC&Rs by a title search since they 
were outside her chain of title. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, held that the plaintiff did 
have constructive notice of the CC&Rs and was bound by the covenants therein. The Court 
reasoned that Idaho's statutory scheme mandates that constructive notice be imparted as soon as 
an instrument is recorded (§ 55-811). A duly acknowledged instrument is deemed recorded 
under § 55-809 as soon as it is deposited with the recorder's office (Jd at 289-90). As a result, 
even an instrument that is thereafter improperly filed for record or indexed by the recorder 
imparts constructive notice (Jd at 290). As succinctly stated by Justice Eismann in a concurring 
opinion - an instrument conveying an interest in real property imparts "constructive notice from 
the time it is filed 'with the recorder', not from the time it is filed or indexed by the recorder". 
Plaintiffs' mortgage thus gave the Gunters constructive notice of its existence the moment it was 
filed for record even though the Gunters would not have been able to find it in a search of their 
title. While that conclusion may seem unfair, it is not only mandated by the clear language of § 
55-811, but the holdings of Simonson and Skvorak. That conclusion also does not make Idaho's 
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statutory scheme a "race only" statute since the notice element ofIdaho's "race-notice" scheme 
exists as a matter oflaw the moment IMLC's mortgage was recorded. 
D. The Gunters Had Actual Knowledge Of Plaintiffs' Loan. The only disputed issue 
in this case, though not determinative of the priority issue under Skvorak, is the Gunters' claim 
that they did not know Summitt was borrowing money from IMLC. While Mr. Gunter may not 
have appreciated that fact and may never have been told given that his wife handled the 
transaction, Mrs. Gunter undoubtedly knew. To believe otherwise means that this Court would 
have to believe Mr. Hazel's testimony was perjured, that he instead hid the fact ofIMLC's 
involvement from the Gunters, that Mr. Krivor was never identified to Mrs. Gunter as being from 
IMLC, that Stephanie Reif never contacted Sommerfeld to coordinate closings and money 
delivery, but instead aided Mr. Hazel in keeping IMLC's loan secret, and that Sommerfeld did 
not disclose her knowledge ofIMLC's loan as the Gunters' agent and friend. The Gunters would 
also have to plausibly explain (1) why they did not foreclose when Summitt first defaulted if they 
truly thought they had $600,000 or so in equity in the property above their lien, (2) the absence 
of any claims about priority until this action began and (3) why, after admittedly learning of their 
junior position in December of2007, they against extended the loan and modified their deed of 
trust. 
The more plausible scenario is that Mr. Hazel is not a crook, that he did in fact tell Mrs. 
Gunter he was borrowing from IMLC and introduced Mr. Krivor to her as he testified, that 
IMLC processed its loan as usual and in so doing had several conversations with Sommerfeld 
who naturally would have kept the Gunters apprised, and that the Gunters were agreeable to 
taking a second position since they would realize almost $600,000 from the sale. 
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The Gunters should therefore be held to be just like the sellers in Skvorak - they had both 
actual and constructive knowledge of plaintiffs' loan and mortgage. 
E. The Gunters Had Imputed Knowledge. The testimony of Sommerfeld that she 
did not know about IMLC's loan was pure fabrication. Whether she was trying to help her 
friends or protect herself from a claim is uncertain, but what was certain is that she was not 
telling the truth. 
Sommerfeld knew IMLC was a hard money lender who loaned against the value of real 
property. She knew from 53 transactions spanning several years that IMLC processed and 
closed its loans independent of her escrow. She knew that the money she had to close the deal 
came from IMLC and knew it was a loan (See Exhibits 2, 13 and V). She knew from those 53 
loans that IMLC virtually always took first position security in the property at issue. 
To claim as Sommerfeld did that she did not know or even suspect that IMLC would be 
taking a mortgage against the Gunters' property is fiction of the highest degree. Cementing that 
conclusion is her testimony that had IMLC been taking security in the property, Stephanie 
would have contacted her to coordinate closings. Though she claimed that did not occur, the 
facts speak otherwise. A review of all of the closing documents (deed, mortgage, deed of trust, 
IMLC's check) all show they were signed/executed on June 19th • Since IMLC would not have 
drawn $600,000 and delivered it to Easyway without assuring itself that Easyway was ready to 
close the sale end of the transaction, the timing of those signings clearly establish that the 
"coordination" between Stephanie and Easyway did in fact occur, meaning, of course, that 
Sommerfeld knew full well Summitt was borrowing the balance of the purchase price from 
IMLC. 
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Summitt and the Gunters had selected Easyway Escrow to handle the escrow functions of 
their sale; IMLC did not. Easyway was thus a dual agent of the buyer and sellers in that 
transaction. The issue is therefore whether the knowledge of Easyway is imputed to the 
Gunters. That issue has not been addressed in Idaho, but it has in California, a state with 
virtually identical recording statutes and agency laws. In In Re Marriage of James and Dana 
Cloney, 91 Cal.App.4th 429 (2001)3, the appellate court was presented with a situation where a 
money judgment against James Michael Cloney was properly recorded and thus a lien on any 
real property he owned. Years later, he took title to property in his nickname - Mike Cloney. 
As a result, the judgment was not detected by the title company when Cloney subsequently sold 
the property. When the judgment creditor attempted to execute on the property, the buyers 
contended that they did not have constructive notice of the judgment in light of the name 
differences. The California court did not need to address that issue, since it found the parties' 
escrow agent had seen the seller's driver's license bearing his legal name while notarizing 
documents to consummate the sale. The court held that the actual knowledge of the true legal 
name of the seller was imputed to the buyers who thus took title with constructive knowledge of 
the lien whether or not the recording statutes also gave constructive notice. 
The Cloney court recognized that an escrow agent serves dual masters and therefore 
reduced the analysis to two inquiries. First, was the information arguably imputed acquired in 
the course and scope of the agency? Second, was the information material to the subject matter 
of the agency (Id at 438-440)? If both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the law 
conclusively imputes knowledge to the agent's principal. Because the agent in Cloneyacquired 
knowledge of the seller's legal name while acting in her capacity as an escrow agent and since 
3 Copy attached. 
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that infonnation was material to her duties, the agent's knowledge was constructively imparted 
to the buyers. 
The same is true in this case. Easyway Escrow had knowledge during the course of the 
transaction that Summitt was borrowing the balance of the purchase price. That infonnation 
was acquired during the course and scope of its agency and material to its function as an escrow 
agent. Whether or not the Gunters had actual knowledge ofIMLC's loan and mortgage is thus 
irrelevant. The Gunters' agent knew and they are charged by law with that knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' lien is a purchase money mortgage. It was recorded before the Gunters' deed 
of trust and thus takes priority as a matter of law as declared by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Skvorak. The Gunters' admittedly received $600,000 from plaintiffs. Their deed of trust cannot 
take priority because it was recorded second and the Gunters cannot claim BFP status because 
they had actual, imputed and/or constructive notice of plaintiffs' mortgage at the time they 
recorded. 
Dated: July 2,2010 Dean & Kolts 
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Marc Lyons 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
r8J U.S. MAIL 
D FED EX GROUND 
D HAND DELIVERED 
D OVERNIGHT MAIL 
D FACSIMILE 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
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Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
Dean & Kolts 
320 E. Neider Ave., Suite 103 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 664-7794 / Fax (208) 664-9844 
ISB #5763 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability, ) 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an, ) 
unmarried man; HLT REAL ESTATE LLC, ) 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE, ~ 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January, ) 
27,1998, sole and separate property of, ) 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT, ) 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited, ) 
liability company, ~ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON, 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an, 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of, 
DAREN BROTT; and PATRICK GUNTER 
and, MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
------------------------------) 
Case No.: CV 08-1538 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Category LA 
Fee: $10 1.00 
TO: THE PARTICK GUNTER AND MONICA GUNTER AND THEIR ATTORNEY, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The plaintiffs appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the Amended Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 17th day of Augus 
2010, Honorable Judge John T. Mitchell, presiding. 
-33l/-
NOTICE OF APPEAL - I 
2. That the appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 11(a)(3), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants then 
intend to assert in the appeal are: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Respondents were the "initial 
encumbrancers" despite the fact their deed of trust was recorded after Appellants' Mortgage; and 
b. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Respondents did not have 
constructive notice of Appellants' Mortgage and were thus good faith encumbrancers; and 
c. Whether the trial court erred in finding Appellants' Mortgage was not 
purchase money; and 
d. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellants' Mortgage and 
Respondents' deed of trust were not given as part of a "continuous transaction"; and 
e. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Respondents did not have 
imputed knowledge of Appellants' Mortgage. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: All trial proceedings occurring on the record on June 28, 2010. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record: 
a. Complaint 
b. Answer of Respondents 
c. Default of Defendants Summitt, Hazel and Brott 
d. Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment and All Supporting and Reply 
Documents and Pleadings 
e. Respondents' Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
f. Order on Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
-:}3S-
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
g. Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration and All Supporting and Reply 
Documents and Pleadings 
h. Respondents' Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration 
J. Appellants' Trial Brief 
k. Respondents' Trial Brief 
1. Appellants' Post-Trial Brief 
m. Respondent's Post-Trial Brief 
n. Memorandum of Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order 
o. 
p. 
q. 
Judgment 
Amended Judgment 
Notice of Appeal 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) (1) [x] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has 
been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript 
fee because ------------------------------------------------------------
(c) (1) [x] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's 
record has been paid. 
(2) [] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because __________________________________________ _ 
(d) (1) [x] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
because -------------------------------------------------------------
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
-33t;-
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Dated thisl!i£Ay of September 2010. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of September 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Marc Lyons 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
rgJ U.S. MAIL o FEDEX GROUND o HAND DELIVERED o OVERNIGHT MAIL o FACSIMILE 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Julie K. Foland 
Official court Reporter - lD CSR No. 639 
324 West Garden Avenue • P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
Phone: (208) 446-1130 
Email: jfoland@kcgov.us 
~ss 
DOCKET NO. 38158-2010 
( 
( INSIGHT LLC 
( 
( vs. 
( 
( PATRICK GUNTER 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on October 26, 2010, I lodged a transcript of 220 pages 
in length, including the June 28,2010, Court Trial, for the above-referenced appeal with the 
District Court Clerk of the County of Bonner in the First Judicial District. 
JULIE K. FOLAND 
October 26, 2010 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
Dean & Kolts 
320 E. Neider Ave., Suite 103 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
(208) 664-7794 / Fax (208) 664-9844 
ISB #5763 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, an Idaho limited liability, ) Case No.: CV 08-1538 
company; DONALD F. HUTTON, an, ) 
unmarried man; HL T REAL EST ATE LLC, ) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
an Idaho limited liability company; THE, ~ Category L.4 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, Dated January, ) Fee: $101 .00 (Previously Paid) 
27, 1998, sole and separate property of, ) 
DANIEL C. EARLE; and INDEPENDENT, ) 
MORTGAGE LTD. CO., an Idaho limited, ) 
liability company, ~ 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SUMMIT, INC., an Idaho corporation; RON, ) 
HAZEL, an individual; SARAH HAZEL, ) 
spouse of Ron Hazel; DAREN BROTT, an, ) 
individual; SUSAN BROTT, spouse of, ~ 
DAREN BROTT; and PATRICK GUNTER ) 
and, MONICA GUNTER, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants. ~ 
TO: THE PARTICK GUNTER AND MONICA GUNTER AND THEIR ATTORNEY, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The plaintiffs appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme 
"" 
Court from the Amended Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 17th day of Augus 
2010, Honorable Judge John T. Mitchell, presiding. 
-31D-
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· I 
2. That the appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 11(a)(3), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants then 
intend to assert in the appeal are: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Respondents were the "initial 
encumbrancers" despite the fact their deed of trust was recorded after Appellants' Mortgage; and 
b. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Respondents did not have 
constructive notice of Appellants' Mortgage and were thus good faith encumbrancers; and 
c. Whether the trial court erred in finding Appellants' Mortgage was not 
purchase money; and 
d. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellants' Mortgage and 
Respondents' deed of trust were not given as part of a "continuous transaction"; and 
e. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Respondents did not have 
imputed knowledge of Appellants' Mortgage. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: All trial proceedings occurring on the record on June 28, 2010. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record: 
a. Complaint 
b. Answer of Respondents 
c. Default of Defendants Summitt, Hazel and Brott 
d. Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment and All Supporting and Reply 
Documents and Pleadings 
e. Respondents' Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
f. Order on Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
-:3'/1-
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
g. Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration and All Supporting and Reply 
Documents and Pleadings 
h. Respondents' Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration 
J. Appellants' Trial Brief 
k. Respondents' Trial Brief 
1. Appellants' Post-Trial Brief 
m. Respondent's Post-Trial Brief 
n. Memorandum of Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order 
o. 
p. 
q. 
Judgment 
Amended Judgment 
Notice of Appeal 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) (1) [x] That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has 
been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript 
fee because -------------------------------------------------------------
(c) (1) [x] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's 
record has been paid. 
(2) [] That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because ____________________________________________ _ 
(d) (1) [ x] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
because ---------------------------------------------------------------
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
- 3'/2-
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Dated this 27th day of October 2010. 
Charles R. Dean, Jr., Attorney for e 
Appellants 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of October 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Marc Lyons 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Julie Foland 
Court Reporter 
324 Garden Ave. 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-9000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, DONALD F. 
HUTTON, AN UNMARRIED MAN, 
HLT REAL ESTATE LLC AND IDAHO 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, THE 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, DATED 
JANUARY 27, 1998, SOLE AND 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF DANIEL C. 
EARLE and INDEPENDENT 
MORTAGAGE LTD. CO., AN IDAHO 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUMMIT, INC., AN IDAHO ) 
CORPORATION, RON HAZEL, ) 
AN INDIVIDUAL, SARAH HAZEL, ) 
SPOUSE OF RON HAZEL, DAREN ) 
BROTT, AN INDIVIDUAL, SUSAN ) 
BROTT, SPOUSE OF DAREN BROTT, ) 
and PATRICK GUNTER AND MONICA) 
GUNTER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, ) 
Defendants/ Respondents. ) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO 38158-2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of 
the pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this,2 YI(t day of \/j} .?"VlCiLJ I 2011. 
MARIE SCOTT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Oerk's Certificate 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
INSIGHT LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED 
LIABIliTY COMPANY, DONALD F. 
HUTTON, AN UNMARRIED MAN, 
HLT REAL ESTATE LLC AND IDAHO 
LIMITED LIABIliTY COMPANY, THE 
EARLE-HENRION TRUST, DATED 
JANUARY 27, 1998, SOLE AND 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF DANIEL C. 
EARLE and INDEPENDENT 
MORTAGAGE LTD. CO., AN IDAHO 
LIMITED liABILITY COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUMMIT, INC., AN IDAHO ) 
CORPORATION, RON HAZEL, ) 
AN INDIVIDUAL, SARAH HAZEL, ) 
SPOUSE OF RON HAZEL, DAREN ) 
BROTT, AN INDIVIDUAL, SUSAN ) 
BROTT, SPOUSE OF DAREN BROTT, ) 
and PATRICK GUNTER AND MONICA) 
GUNTER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, ) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO 38158-2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United 
Parcel Service or US Priority Mail one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
MARC LYONS 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR d'ALENE, ID 83816 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
Certificate of Service-1 
~~ 
MR. CHARLES R. DEAN 
DEAN & KOLTS 
320 E. NEIDER AVE. 
COEUR d' ALENE, ID 83815 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this.3f'd day of '1r2~ ,2011. 
Marie Scott, Clerk of the District Court 
~~ Depu Clerk 
Certificate of Service- 2 
